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INTRODUCTION
The repatriation and return1 of objects of cultural value are often
linked to decolonization projects and efforts to repair past wrongs
suffered as a result of colonialism.2 Yet, significant barriers hinder
these efforts. These barriers primarily take the shape of time
limitations; diverging conceptions of property and ownership; the
high costs involved; and the domestic export and cultural heritage
laws (of both the source country and the destination country). This
Article argues that these barriers are relics of colonialism that
replicate and perpetuate the continued imposition of Eurocentric and
1

The term "repatriation" is used to refer to the restoration of cultural objects
within a state, such as from Canada to its domestic indigenous groups or
communities. The term "return,” however, is used to describe the restoration of
cultural objects that were removed from the territorial borders of a state, usually
during colonial occupation, or illegally exported from a state. See, e.g., CRAIG
FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
142–45 (Routledge 2010).
2
See, e.g., DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, G.A. Res.
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/142 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP],
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf; Catherine Bell,
Repatriation of Cultural Material to First Nations in Canada: Legal and Ethical
Justifications in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST,
COLONIZATION, AND COMMERCE 81, 87 (James A. R. Nafziger & Ann M.
Nicgorski eds., Brill Academic Publishers, Inc. 2009) [hereinafter Bell,
Justifications].
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Western3 legal notions, as well as, values on subaltern source
countries and source indigenous groups.4 In order to truly move
beyond the remaining relics of colonialism into a context where the
culture and values of all groups are accorded equal respect, it is
important that these barriers be removed.
A critical postcolonial lens will be used to explore these barriers
within international and domestic (primarily Canadian) legal
frameworks.5 This Article considers potential methods and
mechanisms for overcoming these barriers/colonial relics and asks
whether these potential solutions are themselves only an extension
of colonialism. This can be seen since these solutions engage with
and replicate Eurocentric and Western legal notions and values

3

The author uses both terms to account for the different challenges, views,
approaches, and legal frameworks existing in Europe and the "West,"
respectively. The two can be mutually exclusive. See, e.g., JOHN M. HOBSON,
THE EUROCENTRIC CONCEPTION OF WORLD POLITICS: WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL THEORY, 1760-2010 at 234 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
4
For the present purpose, the author will view both indigenous groups and
source countries as subaltern in comparison to the loci where repatriation and
return is sought and where mechanisms for repatriation and return are developed
and subsequently imposed upon the subaltern. The particular scope of my
discussion of sources groups and countries versus destinations, leads to a binary
where non-Western/non-Eurocentric state legal systems as well as nonWestern/non-Eurocentric non-state centered legal orders are often
simultaneously marginalized in comparison to Western/Eurocentric frameworks.
As such, my discussion of the subalternity prevalent within many traditional
source groups and source states of cultural objects is limited. See generally
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg, eds.,
Macmillan, 1988); JOANNE SHARP, GEOGRAPHIES OF POSTCOLONIALISM:
SPACES OF POWER AND REPRESENTATION ch. 6 (SAGE 2009) (discussing the
subaltern). See, e.g., Val Napoleon, Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders, in
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM 229, 243–44 (René
Provost & Colleen Sheppard, eds., Springer, 2013) (referencing the Canadian
Aboriginal context and internal oppression and power imbalances). The author
also draws on the permutation of subaltern studies seen in the work of
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and subaltern cosmopolitanism. See, e.g., TOWARD
A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2d ed. 2002).
5
Due to the author’s focus on the international context as well as the Canadian
domestic context, the author will largely avoid undertaking an in-depth analysis
of the situation in the United States since the existence of the North American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) imports many nuances that
are distinct from Canada and beyond the scope of the present project. But see the
Native American Graves and Repatriation Act, Pub L No 101-601 (1990)
(codified as 25 U.S.C. § 3001) [hereinafter NAGPRA].

2016]

Res Extra Commercium and the Barriers Faced

301

rather than stepping outside of the hegemonic structure in order to
incorporate alternative legal and cultural norms, notions, and values.
This Article draws on a transsystemic methodology6 in order to
seek out alternative solutions, underlie commonalities, and strip
away the colonial gaze.7 This Article refers to Peter H. Welsh’s
notion of the potent object,8 in order to remove Eurocentric and
Western-based definitions of what constitutes a cultural object for
which repatriation or return may be claimed.9 The Article turns to
Roman law, Quebec civil law, and legislative interpretation in
Quebec case law in order to excavate a legal-pluralistic application
of res extra commercium, and specifically, res divini juris and res
sacrae, to the repatriation and return of potent cultural objects to
source states and indigenous groups that demand their return.10
Finally, this Article suggests that through greater international
recognition and a more complete application of the res extra
commercium status of potent cultural objects, pervasive Western
and Eurocentric commodification of these objects can be removed.
By removing this commodification, hegemonic barriers enforced by
Western and Eurocentric notions of value, ownership, and legal
frameworks, in order to approach claims for return and repatriation
in a non-colonial fashion, can be achieved.11
6

A transsystemic approach excavates existing legal frameworks in order to look
at what is underneath—it seeks a step beyond legal pluralism. See infra Part I.A;
see infra notes 16–18.
7
See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books 1979); FRANTZ FANON,
BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann, trans., Grove Press
1991).
8
Welsh, infra note 36 and accompanying text.
9
An example of this would be the pervasive reference to the “sacred” which is a
simplistic view of objects of extreme cultural importance to claimant groups.
10
For Roman terminology, see Sohm, infra note 304 and accompanying text.
11
In discussing legal orders, systems, and frameworks, the author uses the term
“legal framework” in the spirit of the transsystemic methodology the author
seeks to apply. Infra notes 16–18. The author’s intention is to utilize a neutral
term that refers to both state-centered legal systems as well as non-state centered
legal orders. Certain scholars, such as Val Napoleon have distinguished between
legal systems and legal orders so as to avoid the imposition of Western and
Eurocentric legal notions onto non-Western, non-Eurocentric, and specifically,
indigenous societies. The author notes the merits of this approach but wishes to
circumvent both terms in order to avoid a separation that may enable their
respective placement in a hierarchy of valuation where one category may be
allotted more importance or legitimacy than the other. The author will instead
simply preface “framework” with “non-Western/non-Eurocentric” and
“Western/Eurocentric.”
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This work proceeds in eleven parts. Part I provides an
introduction to the theory and methodology utilized in the foregoing
analysis and briefly situates the discussion within the related
academic dialogue. Part II undertakes an orienting discussion of the
topic to introduce the notion of the potent cultural object and the
actors involved in claims for the repatriation and return of these
objects. Part III turns to the reasons that motivate claims for the
repatriation and return of potent cultural objects and also briefly
explains the reasons behind counter opinions that reject the
legitimacy of these claims. Part IV then assesses the current legal
frameworks—both international as well as domestic—that are
available and must be utilized in formulating a claim for the
repatriation or return of potent cultural objects. This part
additionally touches on the non-legal (or soft law) mechanisms
available for these purposes. Part V distills the ever-present colonial
element embodied by the barriers—both internationally and
domestically—to claims for repatriation and return within current
frameworks available for repatriation and return. This part examines
the barriers in order to explain why and how they maintain colonial
domination over groups and individuals formulating claims for
repatriation and return. Part VI then turns to current legal and
extralegal strategies that are available and may be used in order to
circumvent the barriers to claims for repatriation and return. This
part, however, concludes that these strategies ultimately maintain
and even further entrench the colonial element rather than removing
it. Part VII therefore suggests an alternative. This part proposes the
removal of commodification from objects. Commodification is
discussed and a transsystemic approach is introduced as means by
which commodification may be removed through the application of
res extra commercium. Part VIII discusses the limited appearance of
res extra commercium within existing Eurocentric and Western
legal frameworks—both in the context of civil law jurisdictions and
common law jurisdictions. This is done in order to recognize that a
notion such as res extra commercium, which describes the
invaluable nature that potent cultural objects carry for claimant
groups and individuals, can also be recognized within dominant
legal frameworks that currently only germinate barriers to claims for
repatriation and return. Part IX presents a case study of a situation
where a dominant legal framework—as applied by the Quebec
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Superior Court and Quebec Court of Appeal—permitted the return
of potent cultural objects to the claimant party, the Roman Catholic
Church. Part X uses the case study of l’Ange-Gardien in Quebec,
Canada to demonstrate a real-world scenario of how, through a legal
pluralistic application of the laws of the Roman Catholic Church
(that define that which constitutes a potent cultural object within its
governing framework), the market value of the element was simply
nullified and returned to the claimant party even where the
possessing parties suffered a monetary loss. This Article concludes
by acknowledging some of the realities pertaining to application and
enforcement and, finally, concludes with a word of caution, which
is included as a pre-emptory note here. What follows is a radical
departure from existing options for claims for repatriation and return
by subaltern groups and countries. It stems from a critical analysis
meant to explore a mechanism to thoroughly challenge current
perceptions and insist on the serious barriers that continue to
populate the status quo within existing options for claims for
repatriation and return.
It is important to note that the intention of this Article is not to
impose Roman law concepts or other Eurocentric or Western legal
notions upon source nations or indigenous groups. Instead, it
articulates a view of how dominant legal infrastructures can and
should deal with situations where domestic indigenous groups or
source nations/groups request the return of potent cultural objects.
It is about how the Western or Eurocentric legal infrastructures deal
with their part in these scenarios, not about how foreign groups must
acquiesce to the laws of nations or peoples in possession of removed
objects.
I. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
In applying post-colonial theory, the Article draws on the notion
of the colonizer’s gaze.12 The barriers to the repatriation and return
of cultural objects are colonial relics as they force the “colonized,”
12

SAID, supra note 7. While Said may have fallen out of favor with some
modern postcolonial theorists (see, e.g., MARK GIBSON, CULTURE AND POWER:
A HISTORY OF CULTURAL STUDIES 190 (Berg 2007)) and that his notion of
orientalism is characterized by a binary structure that does not take into account
subaltern groups within the "colonized,” the colonizer's gaze is useful in
illustrating the barriers to the repatriation and return of cultural objects. See also,
FANON, supra note 7.
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non-Western, and non-Eurocentric into the “colonizer’s” Western
and Eurocentric notions of cultural value and legal frameworks of
ownership and property. This in turn forces the colonized to voice
their claims for repatriation and return within the parameters set out
by the colonizer in order to regain their cultural objects. In this vein,
the Article also employs Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural
hegemony. As Douglas Litowitz wrote:
In a hegemonic regime, an unjust social arrangement
is internalized and endlessly reinforced in schools,
churches, institutions, scholarly exchanges,
museums, and popular culture. Gramsci’s work on
hegemony provides a useful starting point for legal
scholars who understand that domination is often
subtle, invisible, and consensual.13
A Gramscian assessment is an appropriate starting point when
questioning the status quo where the current dominance of Western
and Eurocentric frameworks and perceptions must be faced in
claims for repatriation and return. It additionally furnishes the
critical component in the application of post-colonial theory that
enables a deconstruction of hegemonic structures and the means by
which to step outside of them, in order to investigate alternative
frameworks.14 Reference to cultural hegemony also accounts for
Western and Eurocentric predispositions to reify the Universalist
value of cultural objects and “museumification” of the colonized
subaltern that remains.15
In using a transsystemic methodology,16 the Article seeks to look
“underneath” current legal frameworks in order to consider “law
which is more deeply rooted or profound than the law of legal

13

Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515,
519 (2000).
14
Id. at 515–16.
15
See, e.g., David Fleming, Positioning the Museum for Social Inclusion, in
MUSEUMS, SOCIETY, INEQUALITY 213, 215–16 (Richard Sandell, ed., Routledge
2002); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 339 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, Public Interest].
16
For a general discussion of transsystemia, see Peter L. Strauss,
Transsystemia—Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment?—Is McGill
Leading the Way?, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 763 (2006).
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systems, that which pervades all of them”17 and to move beyond a
comparative approach.18
While a legal pluralist approach incorporating the laws of source
indigenous groups or countries may provide some resolution in
addressing claims for repatriation and return, its focus on: 1) the
“legal;” 2) the conceptualization of “law;” and 3) the ambiguities of
the terms “legal” and “pluralism,” can limit the ability to inclusively
address the often nuanced claims of source indigenous groups and
states for the repatriation and return of potent cultural objects.19
Legal pluralism may intensify disputes while exacerbating
uncertainty. As Brian Tamanaha explained:
Legal disputes usually center on which party has the
better case under the law; disputes in contexts of
legal pluralism present an additional layer of
questions about which law controls when two or
more contrasting legal regimes point toward
different outcomes. This puts at issue the respective
authority and power of the competing legal systems
themselves.20
Vulnerability subsequent to a successful claim may also arise in the
context of a challenge based within the competing legal
framework.21
A transsystemic approach would ideally seek to
“deconflictualize” claims for repatriation and return by lessening the
17

H. Patrick Glenn, Doin' the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal
Traditions, 50 MCGILL L.J. 863, 867 (2005) [hereinafter Glenn, Transsystemic].
18
See Richard Janda, Toward Cosmopolitan Law, 50 MCGILL L.J. 967,
981(2005). For a discussion of transsystemic law as a method of deconstruction
and of engaging with the work of Jacques Derrida, see generally id. and
especially id. at 976.
19
See William Twining, Legal Pluralism 101, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND
DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 112, 115, 122–23
(Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2012) [hereinafter Twining, Legal Pluralism].
20
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development, in
LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN
DIALOGUE 34, 47 (Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds.,
Cambridge U. Press 2012).
21
Id.
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focus on “underlying conflict and the constant need for win/lose
decisions.”22 Moreover, the approach would seek out metanotions—or meta-rules—by examining “legal concepts or
instruments that facilitate the relations between different legal
orders or traditions”23 to establish what has been referred to as a
“sustainable diversity in law.” Thus, the approach focuses on the
accommodation of “diverse legal unities” while attempting to
sidestep the potential pitfalls and clashes involved in the binary
exercise of accommodating difference.24
A transsystemic approach would also seek to reach beyond the
legal pluralist approach to control the complex realities faced by
claimants. For example, claimants may face a lack of any
identifiable legal or normative expression of an object’s potency
within the legal systems, networks, or orders with which they
identify. This can remove their ability to justify the repatriation or
return of the object when facing the possessing entity’s identified
legal framework if that framework presents conflicting property and
ownership laws that shield the possessor. Where a legal pluralist
approach may not account for “internal variations within what may
be claimed to be a single law,” a transsystemic approach would seek
to address the lack of homogeneity within groups or categories of
the population. This approach can better treat the claims of subaltern
groups that remain unacknowledged or have no standing within the
larger cultural group with which they identify or with which the
cultural object is identified.25 A transsystemic approach
deemphasizes the clash and divergences between different legal
frameworks and excavates the underlying commonalities that may

22

H. Patrick Glenn, Sustainable Diversity in Law, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND
DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 95, 105 (Brian
Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds.,Cambridge U. Press 2012)
[hereinafter Glenn, Sustainable Diversity].
23
Id. at 102.
24
See, e.g., id. at 104–07. See generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS
OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (Oxford U. Press, 5th ed.,
2014).
25
Gordon R. Woodman, The Development “Problem” of Legal Pluralism: An
Analysis and Steps toward Solutions, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT:
SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 129, 141 (Brian Tamanaha,
Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
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reveal possibilities for collaboration amongst these frameworks.26
The intention of this archaeology of legal frameworks is to: 1) focus
on the underlying fluidity beneath different legal and non-legal
orders rather than a potentially disjunctive or combative
combination; 2) remove the categorization and separation of
different legal frameworks that enables the potentiality of
hierarchical ordering and valuation of certain frameworks over
others with a view to disempowering the powerful and neutralizing
the dominant;27 and 3) avoid a further entrenching of hegemonic
injustice and domination, with the goal of greater respect for
traditionally marginalized non-Western and non-Eurocentric legal
frameworks.
As Sally Engle Merry suggests, “Understanding law in
contemporary post-colonial societies requires an archaeology of
law: a historical unpacking of this complexity.”28 Looking “under”
the law, and past the borders of particular jurisdictions or legal
traditions leads to the discussion of a concept that appears in Roman
law: res extra commercium. Res extra commercium removes an
object from the possibility of sale, renders it unmerchantable,
inalienable, and outside of the reaches of the market due to the
object’s potent characteristics.29
This Article considers Roman law (res divini juris and res extra
commercium) and the appearance of similar notions in modern
civilian legal frameworks and international law, especially in the
Province of Quebec, Canada. While recognizing that a legal pluralist
approach is no cure-all and may suffer from the faults referred to
above,30 it nonetheless provides an important element in the
26

For an excellent discussion pertaining to the connectors across legal traditions,
notably within Canada, see JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS
CONSTITUTION 118–24 (Univ. of Toronto Press 2010).
27
For a discussion of the hierarchies of legal systems in Canada, see id. at 12–
22.
28
Sally Engle Marry, Legal Pluralism and Legal Culture: Mapping the Terrain,
in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN
DIALOGUE 66, 68 (Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
29
See, e.g., CULTURAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, AND INDIGENOUS
536–37 (James A. R. Nafziger, Robert Kirkwood Paterson & Alison Dundes
Renteln, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
30
See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ often-quoted statement referring to
some of the inadequacies of the notion of legal pluralism: “To my mind there is
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application of a transsystemic methodology. As such, legal
pluralism is referred to make sense of the method used in Quebec
civil law to apply res extra commercium to the repatriation of
cultural objects claimed as sacred under canon law.
Quebec is an example to draw on as it presents a jurisdiction
already ripe with legal pluralism due to the interaction of the
province’s civil law framework, based on the Civil Code of Quebec,
and Canada’s federal common law framework—especially where
the remainder of Canadian provincial (or territorial) legal
frameworks are structured according to common law principles.
Additionally, with reference to the case of l’Ange-Gardien, there is
an example of the acknowledgment of an underlying unifying
notion—res extra commercium—between Quebec civil law and
cannon law.31 This “meta-notion” is uncovered in the very particular
context of a state’s legal treatment of the claims for the return of
potent cultural objects by an institution (the Catholic Church) that
has been strongly associated with past colonization and is not
traditionally linked to subalternity or marginalization. Quebec also
provides an interesting example of the documented coexistence of
both state law pluralism as well as what Gordon Woodman describes
nothing inherently good, progressive, or emancipatory about ‘legal pluralism.’”
(TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND
EMANCIPATION 114 (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2d ed., 2002). Instead, Santos
“prefer[s] to speak of a plurality of legal orders.” Id. Santos introduces the
notion of “interlegalities,” which more effectively addresses “the conception of
different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds, as
much as our actions.” Id. at 472–73 (emphasis added). As opposed to the more
traditional notion of legal pluralism that focuses the coexistence of separate
legal systems, networks or orders in the same geographical space and period of
time. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 83
(Northwestern Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter TWINING, GLOBALISATION].
However, for the present scope the author will refer generally to legal pluralism
as the interaction and incorporation of a plurality of legal orders that coexist in
the same time and space, and interact and are (ideally) accepted and
acknowledged by the dominant framework within which claims for repatriation
and return must often be filtered. In addition, Brian Tamanaha provides helpful
guidance for a progressive discussion and application of the notion of legal
pluralism today with a list of six groupings of “systems of normative ordering in
social arenas. Brian Z Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to
Present, Local to Global (2008) 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 [hereinafter Tamanaha,
Understanding]. See also Woodman, supra note 25 at 133–38.
31
L'Ange-Gardien (Paroisse) c. Québec (Procureur Général) (1987), 8 Q.A.C. 1
(Can.).
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as “deep legal pluralism” (in which state law coexists with non-state
laws).32
While reference to Roman law may seem paradoxical to a postcolonial approach, due to its grounding importance to many colonial
legal orders, it may be investigated transsystemically in order to
seek out “meta-notions” that are understandable across legal
traditions, such as res extra commercium. These can then enable a
node of agreement, or a bridge, between traditions in order to
achieve a sustainable diversity in law that may provide recourse to
claimants where a clash between legal frameworks and values
cannot be effectively negotiated—notably where claimants are in
highly subaltern situations.33 “Meta-notions” that are
understandable, acceptable, or recognized by both dominant
segments of society and marginalized segments of society, but
which are also favorable to the interests of marginalized groups,
may ultimately be more easily implemented. But where no node of
agreement can be established, legal pluralism remains a helpful
default approach.
It is additionally worth noting that legal pluralism itself may face
a similar critique of its paradoxical application in the post-colonial
context where “[t]o a large extent the roots of contemporary legal
pluralities of global law are buried in the colonial era.”34 But, legal
pluralism remains valuable as a tool when approached as a fluid
concept addressing both the factual reality of plural legal orders (or,
the “social fact” of legal pluralism)35 and the theoretical tools it may
provide, rather than defining legal pluralism according to the byproducts of its prior instances.
Turning to the cultural objects in question, Welsh’s term “potent
object” is used for a non-secular and neutral understanding of
cultural objects that moves beyond Western and Eurocentric
imposition of limiting terms such as “sacred.” The “potent object”
32

Woodman, supra note 25, at 132.
Glenn, Sustainable Diversity, supra note 22 at 104–05. Cf. BOAVENTURA DE
SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (Butterworths
LexisNexis, 2d ed., 2002) (notion of a non-hegemonic use of hegemonic legal
tools).
34
Merry, supra note 28, at 67. See also TWINING, GLOBALISATION, supra note
30, at 224.
35
See, e.g., Twining, Legal Pluralism, supra note 19, at 120–22.
33
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also enables a better representation of a cultural object’s importance
within political, moral, economic, and religious domains.36
Finally, commodification of culture and cultural objects is
referred to, as well as, the alternative conception of “ownership as
belonging” rather than “ownership as property”37 This allows for the
argument that the res extra commercium status of potent objects,
combined with a legal-pluralistic approach, deferring to the claimant
group’s demonstration of an object’s potency to their culture
established according to their internal norms and frameworks, will
lead to the decommodification of potent cultural objects and
removal from the market.38 This will, in turn, enable a neutralization
of the hegemony of Western and Eurocentric conceptions of the
market value of cultural objects that ultimately creates an
overarching barrier within the legal frameworks for repatriation and
return.
A. Engaging with the Literature Gap
There is a dearth of material dealing with the repatriation and
return of cultural objects on four fronts. First, there is a lack of
36

Peter H. Welsh, Repatriation and Cultural Preservation: Potent Objects,
Potent Past, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 837, 857–58 (1992).
37
On the commodification of culture, see generally, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS:
COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (Arjun Appadurai, ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1986); RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN
LAW AND CULTURE 137 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, eds., New
York Univ. Press 2005). See also Rosemary J. Coombe & Joseph F. Turcotte,
Indigenous Cultural Heritage in Development and Trade: Perspectives from the
Dynamics of Cultural Heritage Law and Policy, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 221 (Christopher
Beat Graber, Karolina Kuprecht & Jessica Christine Lai, eds., Edward Elgar
2012); Rosemary J. Coombe, Legal Claims to Culture in and Against the
Market: Neoliberalism and the Global Proliferation of Meaningful Difference,
1L. CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES 32 (2005) [hereinafter Coombe, Legal
Claims]. See also Francesca Fiorentini, The Trade of Cultural Property: Legal
Pluralism in an Age of Global Institutions, in LA CONVENCIÓN DE LA UNESCO
DE 1970 SUS NUEVOS DESAFIOS (Jorge A. Sánchez Cordero, ed., Univ.
Autónoma de México 2013). On “ownership as belonging” versus “ownership
as property,” see Brian Noble, Owning as Belonging/Owning as Property: The
Crisis of Power and Respect in First Nations Heritage Transactions with
Canada, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE STUDIES,
VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 465 (Catherine Bell & Val Napoleon, eds., UBC
Press 2008).
38
See Oliver Metzger, Making the Doctrine of Res Extra Commercium Visible
in United States Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 615, 641 (1996).
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literature dealing specifically with the barriers to repatriation and
return, and why these barriers exist. While some of the more
thorough orienting studies on the subject contain sections that
briefly mention the barriers to repatriation and return, finding a
solution requires an in-depth analysis.39 Second, the in-depth
analysis needed requires both a practical assessment of the material
and legal reality as to why these barriers exist as well as a rigorous
theoretical assessment. Third, for this theoretical assessment to find
potential application, a methodology is required—a methodology
through transsystemia as well as through legal pluralism. Fourth,
while res extra commercium appears in various discussions related
to cultural property, primarily in terms of civil law jurisdictions,
there has not been an exploration of the complete application of the
notion across legal traditions through the use of legal pluralism that
would ultimately lead to decommodification of potent cultural
objects in the context of repatriation and return.40
II. THE “CULTURAL OBJECT”
A cultural object forms part of the generally defined cultural
heritage and property of a particular cultural group.41 The definition
of a cultural object within the international legal framework appears
in Articles 1, 4, and 13(d) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (“1970 UNESCO
Convention”).42 According to these provisions, states are at liberty
39

See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 1; IRINA A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL
PROPERTY LAW: A COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND
EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Edward Elgar 2011).
40
See, e.g., Keith Siehr, The Protection of Cultural Heritage and International
Commerce, 6 INT’L. J. CULTURAL PROPERTY 304, 306 (1997); Metzger, supra
note 38; Alessandra Lanciotti, The Dilemma of the Right to Ownership of
Underwater Cultural Heritage: The Case of the 'Getty Bronze, in CULTURAL
HERITAGE, CULTURAL RIGHTS, CULTURAL DIVERSITY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (Silvia Borelli & Federico Lenzerini, eds., Martinus
Nijhoff 2012); FORREST, supra note 1; STAMATOUDI, supra note 39.
41
Controversy exists concerning whether the correct way of viewing this
material should be through the lens of cultural property or cultural heritage.
Much has been written on this debate and is not within the scope of the present
Article. See, e.g., Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage,
115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 641 (2011).
42
International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 (June 27,
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to delineate the parameters of their cultural property as long as the
property in question: 1) is of importance in terms of archaeology,
prehistory, history, literature, art, and science; and 2) belongs to one
of the categories appearing in Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.43 However, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention On

1989) (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). UNESCO is the acronym for the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation. According to Article
1 of its Constitution, UNESCO is tasked with assuring "the conservation and
protection of the world's inheritance of works of art and monuments of history
and science" and is thus authorized under Article 2(a) and (c) to "recommend
such international agreements as may be necessary." Constitution of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 4 U.N.T.S. 275, art.
IX (Nov. 16, 1945) (entered into force Apr. 7, 1948). Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property, Oct. 12–Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231
[hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention].
43
See also FORREST, supra note 1, at 36–37. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra
note 42; The categories are:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals
and anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of
science and technology and military and social history, to the
life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to
events of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular
and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or
archaeological sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by
hand on any support and in any material (excluding
industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by
hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any
material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any
material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents
and publications of special interest (historical, artistic,
scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in
collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and
cinematographic archives;
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Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects (“1995 UNIDROIT
Convention”)44 specifically introduced the notion of a “cultural
object.”45 These conventions provide sterilized definitions of objects
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and
old musical instruments.
44
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Convention on
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 34 I.L.M. 1322, art. 2, annex
(June 24, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 UNIDROIT Convention]. UNIDROIT is the
acronym for the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, an
independent intergovernmental organization situated in Rome and established in
1926.
45
The definition of a "cultural object" is the product of a compromise between
the desire for a general definition, which some feared was too expansive, and an
enumerative definition, which some feared was too restrictive. The result of this
contested issue is the appearance of (1) a general definition for "cultural object"
in Article 2 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. Id. at art. 2, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention (An
object that “on religious or secular grounds, [is] of importance for archaeology,
prehistory, history, literature, art or science.”); which must then also belong to
one of the categories listed in a separate annex at the end of the Convention:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science
and technology and military and social history, to the life of
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of
national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological
sites which have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by
hand on any support and in any material (excluding
industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by
hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any
material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any
material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific,
literary, etc.) singly or in collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic
archives;
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that hold great meaning to the source states and indigenous groups,
and the contexts where they originated. This sterilization reveals
part of why existing frameworks for cultural property and heritage
law are problematic for source countries and indigenous groups in
demonstrating the importance that an object carries to them.46
A. The Potent Object
Welsh describes the “potent object” as follows: “Humans
saturate tangible objects—whether sacred or not—with a quality we
can call ‘potency’: that is, an individual object has the potential to
embody and project simultaneously a multitude of meanings and
interpretations.”47 Welsh chooses the term “potent” in place of
words such as “religious” or “sacred” because the “potent object”
encompasses not only the often-sacred characteristics of these
objects, but it extends beyond the sacred to refer to objects that
derive importance from the centrality to a claimant state or group’s
political, economic, moral, and religious domains.48 This is much
broader than the sectarian connotations of terms such as “sacred” or
“ceremonial,” yet also more neutral and fluid in allowing for the way
in which an object’s potency may shift and evolve over time.49 To
that end, potency is less mired in Western and Eurocentric notions
of what constitutes the delimited “sacred” object. Potency better
expresses the invaluable, nuanced, and priceless nature of cultural
objects and acknowledges the facet of political reasons for
repatriation and return.50 Welsh suggests that to call an object potent
is equivalent to identifying it, in Western and Eurocentric
terminology, as scientifically significant where the way in which an
object is scientifically significant, or potent, may shift over time.51

(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old
musical instruments.
See also STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 72.
46
See, e.g., Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 291, 297–304 (1999) [hereinafter Harding, Value]; Michael E. Harkin,
Object Lessons: The Question of Cultural Property in the Age of Repatriation 91
J. de la Société des Américanistes 9, 15–17 (2005).
47
Welsh, supra note 36, at 856.
48
Id. at 857–58.
49
Id. at 858.
50
Id. at 862–63.
51
Id. at 858.
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B. The Actors
The actors in projects of repatriation and return can be broadly
separated into: 1) the sources from whom cultural objects were
removed; and 2) the destinations where these cultural objects are
now located.
Within the category of source countries, claims are often
instituted by a state or by indigenous groups found within a state’s
territory. Indigenous groups seeking the return of cultural objects
currently located outside of the territory of the state will sometimes
have their interests represented internationally by the state or will
act as their own representatives.52 An additional dimension that must
be dealt with is whether the cultural object in the destination state is
owned or possessed by a public government controlled agency, such
as a museum, or whether it is in the hands of an individual collector
or private gallery.53
III. REASONS FOR SEEKING THE REPATRIATION AND RETURN OF
POTENT CULTURAL OBJECTS
A. Conflicting Perceptions of Value: Cultural Internationalism
Versus Cultural Nationalism
The importance that repatriation carries to source groups and
countries is recognized in key international documents such as the
United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP).54 The repatriation of cultural objects is sought due to
52

FORREST, supra note 1, at 148.
Catherine Bell, Restructuring the Relationship: Domestic Repatriation and
Canadian Law Reform, in PROTECTION OF FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL
HERITAGE: LAWS, POLICY, AND REFORM 15, 57 (Catherine Bell & Robert K.
Paterson, eds., UBC Press 2009) [hereinafter Bell, Restructuring]; Catherine
Bell & Robert K. Paterson, International Movement of First Nations Cultural
Heritage in Canadian Law, in PROTECTION OF FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL
HERITAGE: LAWS, POLICY, AND REFORM 78, 90 (Catherine Bell & Robert K.
Paterson, eds., UBC Press 2009) [hereinafter Bell & Paterson, International
Movement].
54
UNDRIP, supra note 2:
53

Article 11
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to
maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and
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their inherent value,55 which John Henry Merryman famously
divided into two binary perspectives:56 1) cultural internationalism,
or the Universalist perspective, where cultural objects carry a
universal value for all humankind;57 and 2) cultural nationalism,
which views the value of a cultural object as derived from its
originating context.58
The first perspective places greater importance on universal
access to the cultural object and views cultural heritage as belonging
to all of mankind. As a result, the importance of international
research and scholarship are viewed as paramount and the return of
objects to claimants may be resisted where claimants are seen as
lacking proper academic training to maximize the research and
educational potential of the object.
Within this perspective, cultural objects are tied to their market
value and viewed as valuable resources to be exported and best
managed through free market principles—the party who is willing
to invest the most in purchasing a cultural object will be the most
historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and
visual and performing arts and literature.
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms,
which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with
indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual,
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and
customs.
Article 12
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and
ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in
privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and
control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation
of their human remains.
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of
ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession through
fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.
55
Harding, Value, supra note 46, at 316; FORREST, supra note 1, at 3–7.
56
John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80
AM. J INT’L L. 831 (1986).
57
See, e.g., The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, art. I (May 14, 1954); FORREST,
supra note 1, at 11–13. Merryman is a proponent of this view. See, e.g.,
Merryman, Public Interest, supra note 15.
58
FORREST, supra note 1, at 5.

2016]

Res Extra Commercium and the Barriers Faced

317

likely to properly preserve it.59 Since cultural internationalism is
highly concerned with the proper preservation of cultural objects,
the fact that claimants may not have proper museum facilities within
which to house the objects,60 or that claimants may intend to use the
returned cultural objects for ceremonial, sacred, or other purposes,
can be a terrifying prospect for proponents of this worldview. This
is especially the case for those who have spent much of their careers
carefully watching over the precise humidity and temperature levels
surrounding the cultural object in question. It is these types of
concerns that can sometimes lead cultural internationalists to argue
against the repatriation and return of cultural objects and to argue
that everyone—including museums, dealers, and collectors—should
have a say in decisions involving potent cultural objects, rather than
allowing the voices of the claimants of the objects to take
precedence.61
The second perspective focuses on the repatriation of the
cultural object to its place and culture of origin in order to enable a
thick and contextual understanding of the object and its value.62 This
perspective is also concerned with the reality that many cultural
objects held by institutions for the “universal” benefit often do not
display all items and keep many of these meaningful cultural objects
in storage, thus leaving them inaccessible to the public for many
years.63 In addition, the cultural nationalist perspective may, not
unlike the Universalists, insist on the importance of housing
returned objects in facilities that optimize physical preservation as
well as ongoing research involving the objects.64 Proponents of this
59

Coombe & Turcotte, supra note 37, at 261.
Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 97.
61
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 21; Coombe & Turcotte, supra note 37, at
261.
62
See, e.g., ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS, Vol. 1 at 187 (Joseph A.
Buttigieg, ed., Joseph A. Buttigieg & Antonio Callari, trans., Columbia Univ.
Press 1992).
63
Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 97.
64
Id. See also Catherine Bell et al., Recovering from Colonization: Perspectives
of Community Members on Protection and Repatriation of Kwakwaka’wakwa
Cultural Heritage, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE
STUDIES, VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 33, 75 (Catherine Bell & Val Napoleon,
eds., UBC Press 2008) [hereinafter Bell et al., Recovering]. Situated in Alert
Bay, British Columbia, the U’mista Cultural Center operates a cultural education
museum-calibre facility for housing and preserving cultural objects and
60
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view argue against housing an object in its place of origin because
this fails to maximize the object’s research and education potential.
In a certain sense, interlaced within both of these perspectives
are concerns with the preservation of the cultural object as
something of invaluable worth.65 While cultural internationalism
favors care of the cultural object to be placed with institutions such
as the “universal museum,”66 cultural nationalism asks that the
cultural object be placed with those who have the greatest potential
understanding, connection, and contextual appreciation of the
object.67 Additionally, a removed cultural object may in fact satisfy
the goals of both perspectives in terms of access, understanding, and
context if it is returned to its place and landscape of origin.68
Since preservation places value on a lack of change over
flexibility, it is important to question who truly values this
stagnation, museumification, and freezing of a cultural object as a
relic of past peoples, and the past “Other.”69 Placing greater
importance on a lack of potential change for these important cultural
objects ignores the ongoing and dynamic potent nature they carry
for today’s people. As Welsh succinctly notes, “[p]reserving one’s
information for the future by trained individuals. Associated ongoing research is
also conducted by the U’mista. See also U’MISTA CULTURAL SOCIETY,
http://www.umista.org (last visited May 16, 2016).
65
FORREST, supra note 1, at 14–18.
66
The notion of the "universal museum" arose as a reaction by numerous
leading museums (including but not limited to the British Museum, the Musée
du Louvre, the Museo Nacional del Prado, the Solomon R Guggenheim
Museum, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art) to increasing demands for
repatriation and return of cultural objects to source countries and source
indigenous groups; the result of which was the 2002 Declaration on the
Importance and Value of Universal Museums. The universal museum is seen as
an institution that promotes cultural diversity and cultural exchange by keeping,
showing, and studying the cultural heritage and cultural objects of source
countries and source indigenous groups. See FORREST, supra note 1, at 164–65;
WITNESSES TO HISTORY: A COMPENDIUM OF DOCUMENTS AND WRITINGS ON
THE RETURN OF CULTURAL OBJECTS 116–18 (Lyndel V. Prott, ed., UNESCO
2009), http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/ICOM_News/20041/ENG/p4_2004-1.pdf. The declaration is from the perspective that "[t]he
diminishing collection such as these would be a great loss to the world's cultural
heritage." Id. at 118.
67
FORREST, supra note 1, at 15.
68
This argument is often advanced in relation to the Elgin Marbles. Bell &
Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 97–98; see also
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 30.
69
Welsh, supra note 36, at 838.
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own culture and preserving another’s culture are two very different
things. Preserving one’s own culture is an expression of human
rights, while working to preserve someone else’s culture without
their input or participation is, at best, paternalism.”70 And as Welsh
warns, “In its most insidious form, cultural preservation can freeze
people in an ahistorical moment. Such an approach to cultural
preservation raises visions of dusty shelves filled with murky jars of
pickled things. Cultures cannot be preserved that way.”71
B. The Potent Object and Identity
The importance of a cultural object is inextricably linked to
identity72—whether this is a national identity, a subaltern or cultural
group identity, or otherwise. Cultural objects provide a cultural
context through which the individual and community interact and
differentiate themselves, leading to identity formation. Cultural
objects are deeply connected to the cultural, spiritual, and political
lives of individuals and groups and physically define the output of
the group’s cultural and creative generative process.73 Catherine
Bell notes that it is for this reason that the control, removal, and
destruction of potent cultural objects remains such a powerful means
of domination.74
C. The Potent Object and Knowledge Retention, Creation, and
Revival
The value of a cultural object to the identity of a group is
connected to its role in maintaining a state or indigenous group’s
knowledge of its culture, traditions, and history. Indigenous groups
are often apprehensive about dissipating cultural knowledge, and the
return and repatriation of cultural objects is viewed as invaluable
due to the educational potential of the objects and the cultural
70

Id. at 839.
Id. at 840.
72
Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 89–90; STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at
217; Elizabeth M. Koehler, Repatriation of Cultural Objects to Indigenous
Peoples: A Comparative Analysis of US and Canadian Law, 41 INT'L LAW. 103,
106 (2007).
73
Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 23; Harding, Value, supra note 46, at
335.
74
Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 23; Harding, Value, supra note 46, at
335.
71
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knowledge they embody.75 The creation of future knowledge and
traditions is seen as connected to the presence of these important
cultural items in their context of origin.76
D. Economic Dimension
An economic dimension may also play a role in the desire to
have potent cultural objects repatriated or returned. A source state
or source indigenous group may profit from tourism and
employment opportunities generated from the repatriation and
return of their cultural objects.77 In some cases, this may result in a
transfer of the profit-generating potential of a cultural object from
the hands of the destination state or institution from where it is being
repatriated or returned, to the source state or indigenous group.
E. Decolonization, Self-Determination, and Reparation
The repatriation and return of cultural objects are often sought
in decolonization efforts and as a means of reparation for the past
injustices of colonization.78 The value of cultural objects in this
context is linked to self-determination and the ability of source states
and source indigenous groups to control the potency of the object
and the depiction, viewing, and access to images and information
related to their histories and cultures.79 The potent nature of the
object in question may dictate that it only be displayed or used in
certain manners and context that are not understood or adhered to in
the object’s removed location.80
75

Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 90, 92–93.
FORREST, supra note 1, at 15.
77
Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 90; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at
24; P.J. O'Keefe, Repatriation of Sacred Objects, in WITNESSES TO HISTORY: A
COMPENDIUM OF DOCUMENTS AND WRITINGS ON THE RETURN OF CULTURAL
OBJECTS 225, 226 (Lyndel V. Prott, ed., UNESCO 2009) [hereinafter O’Keefe,
Repatriation]; Kathryn Lafrenz Samuels, Material Heritage and Poverty
Reduction, in HERITAGE AND GLOBALISATION 203 (Sophia Labadi & Colin
Long, eds., Routledge 2010).
78
Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 87; Bell & Paterson, International
Movement, supra note 53, at 93; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 19.
79
Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 93; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at
24–25. See also JENNIFER KRAMER, SWITCHBACKS: ART, OWNERSHIP, AND
NUXALK NATIONAL IDENTITY 90 (UBC Press 2006); Welsh, supra note 36, at
857–58.
80
For example, Hopi kachina masks are not to be put on exhibit as they are
considered to be disembodied parts of kachinas. Welsh, supra note 36, at 860.
76
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IV. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE REPATRIATION
AND RETURN OF CULTURAL OBJECTS
A. International
1. The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention
While legal frameworks for the repatriation of cultural objects
have existed internationally for some time and provide a basic
mechanism for repatriation, the reality is that no effective
international mechanism exists that requires destination states to act
in response to appeals by source states or groups for the return of
potent cultural objects.81 Currently, the two primary conventions are
the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.
The aims of the 1970 UNESCO Convention sought an
international, uniform, base level of protection against the illicit
trafficking of cultural objects.82 As a public law instrument, it
applies to relations between states that are party to the Convention
but provides no rights or recourse to private parties.83 Article 7(b)(ii)
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention specifically addresses the return
of cultural objects to source states where destination states are
instructed:
[A]t the request of the State Party of origin, to take
appropriate steps to recover and return any such
cultural property imported after the entry into force
of this Convention in both States concerned,
Yet this has often been completely disregarded by non-Hopi in the public and
private displays of kachina masks that were removed from the Hopi in the past.
It is these same potent cultural objects that the Hopi were recently unable to
reclaim and were unsuccessful in having their sale delayed from Drouot auction
house in France. See infra Part VI.B.1; Associated Press, Auction House Ignores
Pleas to Delay Sale of Hopi Masks: Auction Makes $1.6 million US, CBC NEWS
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/arts/auction-house-ignores-pleas-todelay-sale-of-hopi-masks-1.2456664. Bell & Paterson, International Movement,
supra note 53, at 93.
81
See also id. at 102.
82
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 33.
83
Id. at 33.
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provided, however, that the requesting State shall
pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to
a person who has valid title to that property. Requests
for recovery and return shall be made through
diplomatic offices. The requesting Party shall
furnish, at its expense, the documentation and other
evidence necessary to establish its claim for recovery
and return. The Parties shall impose no customs
duties or other charges upon cultural property
returned pursuant to this Article. All expenses
incident to the return and delivery of the cultural
property shall be borne by the requesting Party.84
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention sought to fill gaps identified
in the 1970 UNESCO Convention, notably with regard to private
law concerns, and also as a “follow-up” to the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.85 It regulates private law issues in terms of the bona
fide possessor and applies to both states as well as private parties.86
It is based on Article 7(b)(ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.87
The objectives of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention were both
to contribute to the fight against the illicit international trade of
cultural objects as well as to establish a uniform set of minimum
legal rules pertaining to the restitution and return of cultural objects
between states that are party to the Convention.88 It did not apply to
domestic claims of theft or for the domestic repatriation of a cultural
object.89 The convention is characterized by two different regimes
in dealing with return (and restitution) of cultural objects. The first
deals with “restitution of stolen objects,” and the second deals with
“the return of illegally exported objects.”90 The 1995 UNIDROIT

84

1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 42, at art. 7(b)(ii).
Patrick O’Keefe, Using UNIDROIT to Avoid Cultural Heritage Disputes:
Limitation Periods, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF
CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND COMMERCE 389, 390 (James A.R. Nafziger &
Ann M. Nicgorski, eds., Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) [hereinafter O’Keefe,
UNIDROIT]; STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 67.
86
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 33.
87
Id.
88
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, Preamble.
89
See also STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 69.
90
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44. See also Barbara T. Hoffman,
Introduction to Parts II and III: Cultural Rights, Cultural Property, and
85
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Convention’s role is significant in both avoiding and resolving
cultural heritage disputes.91
The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention are complimentary in their goals but are characterized
by a difference in their means.92 They both also suffer from a
number of problems, including their lack of ratification by certain
key countries and enforcement difficulties. For example, Canada has
signed and ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention but has not
signed the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. A number of barriers
(explored in the sections below) have prevented its widespread
adoption.
These international frameworks have limited utility in the
context of repatriation and return since they deal primarily with the
illegal removal or theft of cultural objects that have been removed
after the convention in question has entered into force.93 This is
highly problematic in dealing with the context of colonial wrongs
due to the chronological reality of the time period within which
many of these claimed cultural objects were removed. In addition,
these international frameworks cannot be directly accessed by most
source groups since the groups themselves are not parties to the
conventions—even though the states within which they find
themselves may be.
2. Other International Mechanisms
In terms of “soft law,” there are a number of international bodies
that have developed regulations dealing with cultural property—
consisting primarily of professional codes of ethics. The majority
are limited to the regulation of particular professions that interact
with art, collection, and museology. The contributions of these
mechanisms, while not legally binding, consolidate and promote
trends and “best practices” within these industries.94
International Trade, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 89, 90–91 (Barbara T. Hoffman, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
91
O’Keefe, UNIDROIT, supra note 85, at 390.
92
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 33.
93
See, e.g., 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, at art 10. See also
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 106. The non-retroactivity of a convention is a
standard rule within international law. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331., art 28.
94
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 159–64.
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An example of this type of organization is The International
Council of Museums (ICOM), which is committed to the protection,
conservation, promotion, and continuation of the world’s natural
and cultural heritage. ICOM is a non-profit, non-governmental,
international organization of museums and museum professionals.
ICOM’s primary focus is the fight against illicit trade in cultural
property (it partners with UNESCO in this struggle), with a focus on
prevention.95 It produces a number of awareness-raising
publications, but its most significant document is its code of
professional ethics: the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums (“ICOM
Code”).96 Much of the ICOM Code deals with the acquisition of
cultural objects, but it also provides for the return of objects.97 In
doing so, the ICOM Code refers to the 1970 UNESCO Convention
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, but also contains the
reservation that museums must only cooperate if they are legally
able to—which has allowed some museums to evade claims for
return by referring to their statutes of operation that disallow them
from divesting portions of their collection.98
B. Domestic: The Canadian Context
1. Federal
On a federal level, Canada deals with cultural objects through
the Cultural Property Export and Import Act (CPEIA).99 This Act
applies to the export and import of cultural property but does not
address the repatriation of cultural objects. In contrast to the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)
passed by the United States Congress in October 1990, Canada does
not have federal repatriation legislation.100 Nonetheless, repatriation
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Id. at 180–82.
International Council of Museums [ICM], ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums
(2004) [hereinafter ICOM Code].
97
See id. at rules 6.2–6.4.
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See, e.g., STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 173.
99
Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.1 (Can.).
100
NAGPRA, supra note 5. See also Catherine E. Bell & Robert K. Paterson,
Aboriginal Rights to Cultural Property in Canada, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 167 (1999) [hereinafter Bell & Paterson, Aboriginal
Rights]; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 36.
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claims within Canada may be addressed by policies put in place by
government agencies such as Parks Canada.101
In terms of legislation that specifically addresses Aboriginal
cultural property, Section 91 of the Indian Act refers to a limited
number of cultural objects for which the transfer of title and removal
from the reserve is prohibited “without the written consent of the
Minister.”102
2. Provincial
Certain provinces have developed and utilized their own
repatriation legislation in addressing the repatriation claims of
indigenous groups in Canada.103 Provinces vary widely in the level
of protection availed to cultural property. For the most part,
provinces do not have sufficiently effective legislation to deal with
repatriation claims.104 Alberta, however, has a comparably higher
level of protection where, according to the First Nations Sacred
Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, “The Minister must agree to
the repatriation of a sacred ceremonial object unless, in the
Minister’s opinion, repatriation would not be appropriate.”105
Nonetheless, a “sacred ceremonial object” is delimited to objects
that are “vital to the practice of the First Nation’s sacred ceremonial
traditions.”106
101

Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 36. See also TASK FORCE, REPORT ON
MUSEUMS AND FIRST PEOPLES, TURNING THE PAGE: FORGING NEW
PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN MUSEUMS AND FIRST PEOPLES (3d ed. 1992) [TASK
FORCE].
102
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 91 (Can.). The enumerated objects include
only: Indian grave houses, carved grave poles, totem poles, carved house posts,
and rocks embellished with paintings or carvings. The enumerated objects must
be located on the reserve for this protection to apply.
103
See e.g., First Nations Sacred and Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act,
R.S.A. 2000, c. F-14 (Can. Alta.); Glenbow-Alberta Institute Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. G-6 (Can. Alta.); Museum Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 12 (Can. B.C.). See also Bell,
Restructuring, supra note 53. at 28–43.
104
See also Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at
Common Law: A Contextual Approach, 63 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 11
(2005).
105
First Nations Sacred and Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. F-14, s. 2(2) (Can. Alta.); Cf. Heritage Conservation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
187 (Can. B.C.); Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O-18 (Can. Ont.)
106
First Nations Sacred and Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. F-14, s. 1(e)(iii) (Can. Alta.).
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3. Other
In addition to the federal and provincial contexts, other
repatriation provisions can be found contained within treaties. An
example of this scenario is the Nisga’a Treaty.107 Further, many
Canadian museums have developed repatriation policies to deal with
cultural objects and have generally sought to improve their
relationships with First Nations.108 A number of these policies arose
subsequent to the debates and recommendations of the Task Force
on Museums and First Peoples (“Task Force”).109 The Task Force
addresses the repatriation of sacred objects and cultural patrimony
and notes the importance of involving First Nations in the
management of museum collections as well as acknowledging
internal Aboriginal processes and ownership frameworks and
systems. For example, the Task Force states:
Even in cases where materials have been obtained
legally, museums should consider . . . [the] transfer
107

Chapter 17 of the treaty was the first time the repatriation of cultural objects
from a Canadian government institution (notably, the Canadian Museum of
Civilizations—now known as the Canadian Museum of History—and the Royal
British Columbia Museum) was specifically dealt with by a Canadian First
Nation treaty; see Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1999, c. 2 (Can. B.C.)
(enacted provincially in British Columbia); Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.C.
2000, c. 7 (Can.) [hereinafter Nisga’a Treaty] (enacted federally). Catherine E.
Bell et al., First Nations Cultural Heritage: A Selected Survey of Issues and
Initiatives, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE STUDIES,
VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 367, 368–86 (Catherine E. Bell & Val Napoleon,
eds., UBC Press 2008) [hereinafter Bell et al., Selected Survey].
108
Selected Survey, supra note 107, at 369, 373 (For a more extensive
discussion of particular Canadian museums and their repatriation polices.).
109
TASK FORCE, supra note 101. In particular, the Lubicon Lake First Nation’s
1988 boycott of “The Spirit Sings” exhibit at Calgary, Alberta’s Glenbow
Museum. This exhibit was hosted as part of the Olympic Art Festival and
connected to the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympic Games. Briefly, masks lent by
other museums and institutions were displayed alongside a Mohawk False Face
mask lent by the Royal Ontario Museum. This mask was at the center of the
controversy since some of these masks used in Mohawk healing ceremonies are
regarded as highly sacred and are not to be viewed by non-Aboriginals. Not only
was the return of the mask sought, but the statement of claim additionally asked
for an injunction to stop the display of the False Face mask. Catherine E. Bell,
Graham Statt & the Mookakin Cultural Society, Repatriation and Heritage
Protection: Reflections on the Kainai Experience, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL
HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE STUDIES, VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 203, 212
(Catherine Bell & Val Napoleon, eds., UBC Press 2008); Bell et al., Selected
Survey, supra note 107, at 368–69).
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of title of sacred and ceremonial objects and of other
objects that have ongoing historical, traditional or
cultural importance to an Aboriginal community or
culture. This involves case-by-case negotiation with
the appropriate communities based on moral and
ethical factors above and beyond legal
consideration.110
However, there is no national organization in place to monitor the
implementation of the Task Force recommendations.111
V. BARRIERS TO REPATRIATION AND RETURN: RELICS OF COLONIAL
DOMINATION
The removal, control, and destruction of the cultural objects of
indigenous groups were tools of domination deployed during
colonization periods.112 Yet, even after decolonization, efforts
towards repatriation and return are plagued with barriers that are a
hegemonic reproduction of colonial wrongs and antithetical to
efforts to remedy these wrongs.113 Examining the barriers in a postcolonial context reveals that they constitute colonial relics of
continued domination of source countries and indigenous groups by
destination countries. Further, these barriers force non-Western and
non-Eurocentric norms and values into Western and Eurocentric
frameworks of legal norms and values.114 This obliges nondominant source countries and subaltern, often indigenous, groups
to speak and act according to the languages and laws of the dominant
destination countries in articulating claims for repatriation and
return.115
110

TASK FORCE, supra note 101, at 9.
Bell et al., Selected Survey, supra note 107, at 373.
112
Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 23 (citing Harding Value, supra note
46, at 335).
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See, e.g., Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 87. See also Litowitz, supra
note 13, at 519.
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Amanda Pask, Making Connections: Intellectual Property, Cultural
Property, and Sovereignty in the Debates Concerning the Appropriation of
Native Cultures in Canada, 8 INTELL. PROP. J. 82 (1993); Rosemary J. Coombe,
The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims
in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 249 (1993);
Noble, supra note 37.
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These barriers are divided into four main categories: 1) time; 2)
notions of ownership and property; 3) the domestic laws of source
and destination countries; and 4) costs. These are largely artificial
divisions since the four are intimately interrelated. When a claim is
blocked by a limitation period, this is often also linked to diverging
notions of ownership and property reflected in domestic laws. And
these three interrelated barriers all carry costly ramifications for
claimants—whether due to the costs of the ensuing litigation, the
time, travel, and personal investment required by interested parties,
the monetary investment required to contravene barriers through
repurchasing objects, the funds required to successfully meet
conditions imposed on claimants in most successful repatriation
claims (such as, “proper” venues to house the object in question),
and so on.
While the barriers explored below exist at both the international
and national level, the challenges they pose are magnified at the
international level.116
A. Time
The period of time that has elapsed since the removal of a
cultural object from its source can pose problems in its repatriation,
and this is often perceived as the most significant barrier. While time
limitations are intended to further justice rather than injustice,117 or
at least where “[c]ontemporary limitations statutes seek to balance
protection of the defendant with fairness to the plaintiff,”118 it is
clear that the claiming group or country is at a disadvantage when
negotiating the legal barriers created by the passage of time. The
legal permutations of the passage of time are inextricably linked to
Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks within which source
groups and countries are forced to formulate their claims. Since their
claims do not easily fit within the available frameworks, the initial
116

Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 99. For example,
issues such as language barriers, movement across international borders,
increased costs due to distance, and unfamiliar laws, policies, and traditions
exacerbate the existing challenges to return at an international level. Id.
117
Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 33.
118
Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14,
para. 141 (Can.) (referring to Novak c. Bond (1999), 1 S.C.R. 808, para. 66
(Can.)).
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colonial wrongs that took place when culturally potent objects were
removed are maintained.
Time limitations exist for a number of purposes. In terms of
private property, they can ensure fairness by protecting the
reasonable expectations of innocent good faith purchasers and they
allow for certainty of title in the market.119 Time limitations also
address logistical issues that become problematic with the passage
of time, such as evidentiary problems arising from interpreting past
or present documents or actions by standards not applicable at the
relevant time, or the death of key actors or witnesses.120
Countries vary in their treatment of the passage of time and its
legal results on claims for repatriation and return.121 In common law
jurisdictions, time limitations, estoppel, laches, or prescription must
be considered in formulating and treating claims while, within civil
law jurisdictions, acquisitive prescription (usucapio) and statutory
limitations generally apply to the treatment of time.122 Nuances exist
within each country’s legal frameworks that are beyond the scope of
this project. For the present purposes, this Article provides a general
overview of relevant time limitations, but with specific reference to
Canada’s limitations legislation.123
Broadly, according to the rules of the discoverability principle,
a limitation period begins to run as soon as the claiming party
becomes aware (or could be reasonably expected to have become
aware) of the material facts that form the basis of their claim.124
Time limitations can be used both as a sword and a shield.125 A
current possessor of an object may claim to have become the owner
through the passage of time, thus using the passage of time as a
sword. Or, the current possessor may use the passage of time as a
shield by asserting that the claiming party has not brought their
claim within the applicable time limit.126
119

Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 33; Catherine Bell, Limitations,
Legislation and Domestic Repatriation, 38 U.B.C. L. REV. 149, 151; Kagan,
supra note 104, at 26.
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Briefly, a variety of reasons exist for the passage of time
between the removal of an object and the eventual claim for its
return. This includes the lack of knowledge of a source group or
country as to the location of a removed object,127 as well the
difficulties in tracing cultural objects in the context of international
borderless trade and the potential housing of an object in a littleknown location.128 The difficulty in tracing objects may also be
exacerbated by the purposeful hiding of objects. In addition, it
simply takes time for groups and source states to organize their
claims for repatriation or return as they begin the slow process of
recovery from colonization and the mass removal of cultural objects
from within their borders.
1. Time Internationally
Internationally, the 1970 UNESCO Convention bears no
reference to time limitations.129 As a result, parties to the 1970
UNESCO Convention can apply their respective domestic rules for
time limitations.130 During the drafting of the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention, however, time limitations became a contentious
issue,131 and, limitation periods remain the greatest barrier to the
widespread adoption of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.132
During the drafting process for the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention, two divergent perspectives on time limitations
clashed.133 On one side, states generally classified as destinations
for cultural objects were predominantly in favor of short time limits
due primarily to a concern for stability in the marketplace. Many of
these countries had legal systems based on the common law tradition
where statutes of limitations govern restitution claims once a certain
period of time passes subsequent to the claimant becoming aware of
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O’Keefe, UNIDROIT, supra note 85 at 390.
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UNIDROIT, supra note 85 at 390).
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possessor’s identity.134 The other side was against any time limits at
all, largely influenced by concerns with morality and justice as well
as efficient transactions.135 Many of the countries with this other
perspective had legal systems based on the civil law tradition where
certain property is deemed inalienable and time limitations do not
apply, even if the cultural object is attained by a bona fide
purchaser.136 This clash in perspectives ultimately resulted in the
need for compromise where certain states insisted on including the
principle of inalienability137 while others refused to accept a
convention that included this concept.138 And yet other countries
were constrained by constitutional reasons that would disallow them
from implementing a regime without limitation periods.139
The result of all of this has been the inclusion of a median view
of time limitations that represents no particular state legal system in
treating dispossessed owners.140 Generally, the claimant is provided
a three-year period to make their claim from the time they become
aware of the location of the cultural object and the identity of the
possessor, or, a fifty-year period will be in effect.141 Logistically,
three years does not provide much time for claimants to decide to
pursue and organize a claim, especially where the removal of an
object occurred a long time ago, or if internal conflicts exist within
the source group regarding what action to take after the loss of an
object is discovered.142
The fifty-year period is also problematic due to the practical
effect of the passage of time on evidence that is needed to prove the
circumstances of the removal, as well as the provenance of the
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object.143 The fifty-year period does not account for the reality of
objects removed in the context of colonialism—where source
groups and states may take longer than fifty years to mobilize to
bring a claim, in addition to the logistical time required to trace and
locate objects. Further, the inability to bring a claim due to, for
example, force majeure, is not explicitly accounted for.144
However, pursuant to Article 3(4), the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention does allow for an exception to the fifty-year limitation
period (only the three-year limitation period will apply) where the
object in question forms “an integral part of an identified monument
or archaeological site, or belong[s] to a public collection,”145 or if,
pursuant to Article 3(8) the claim pertains to “a sacred or
communally important cultural object belonging to and used by a
tribal community in a Contracting State as part of that community’s
traditional or ritual use.”146 This extended time limitation was
essentially intended to incorporate the principle of inalienability in
order to speak to the position of a number of countries that apply
this principle to particular classes of property.147 But the removal of
the fifty-year overall time limitation is not absolute since, pursuant
to Article 3(5), the parties to the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are
able to limit this period to seventy-five years “or such longer period
as is provided in its law.”148
Regardless of the compromise represented by the language and
legal concepts that appear in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, and
in addition to the practical problems arising from the three-year and
fifty-year limitation periods respectively, the wording of the
provisions that attempt to address inalienability are severely limiting
for source groups and countries that seek the repatriation of cultural
objects removed. For example, for an object to be “an integral part
of an identified monument or archaeological site,” the monument
must be recorded; however, few monuments have such records.149
The same applies to archaeological sites where many sites have not
143
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been officially “discovered” or documented, such as those pillaged
by “huaqueros” (those who illicitly excavate archaeological sites
and/or remove objects from these sites) in parts of Mexico and South
America. There and elsewhere, archaeological sites have been and
continue to be frequent targets of illegal excavations, leading to
many unrecorded objects.150
In addition, the use of the word “integral” in Article 3(4) of the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention is vulnerable to subjectivity and may
result in a difficult burden in proving an object’s “integral” nature.
The third category of potentially exempt objects includes those
that belong to a “public collection.” Since this is not a term of art,
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention provides a definition in Article
3(7). A “public collection” is “a group of inventoried or otherwise
identified cultural objects” that must be owned by either a: 1)
contracting state; 2) regional or local authority of a contracting state;
3) religious institution in a contracting state; or 4) institution that is
established for an essentially cultural, educational, or scientific
purpose in a contracting state and must be recognized in the state in
question as serving the public interest.151
There are a host of difficulties with this definition. According to
Article 3(7), cultural objects must consist of more than one object in
order to form the requisite “group.” But there is no requirement for
this group of two or more objects to have any sort of unifying
characteristic or theme. The result, as Patrick O’Keefe suggests, is
that a public collection is defined by its owner.152 Next, the cultural
objects must be “inventoried or otherwise identified” by one of the
enumerated owning entities. O’Keefe criticizes this requirement due
to the well-known inaccuracies of most inventories, which limits the
ability to fully claim all of the cultural objects that would otherwise
form part of the public collection.153 The stipulation that the
category of potential owners must serve the “public interest” is also
vulnerable to subjectivity. O’Keefe points out that the collections of
religious institutions receive special treatment as they receive their
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own category of potential owners.154 Yet it is difficult to define and
demarcate what a religious institution consists of and may not
account for particular spiritual movements.155
The fourth category of cultural objects that may be exempt from
the three-year or fifty-year limitation periods is dedicated to stolen
objects that are identified as “a sacred or communally important
cultural object belonging to and used by a tribal or indigenous
community in a [c]ontracting [s]tate.”156 The time limitations
applied here are the same as those applied to public collections. If
the cultural object is not “sacred,” then it must be “communally
important.” But this standard would have to be proven by the
claiming group in the state where they are making the claim157—and
this may be difficult to demonstrate where notions of “communally
important” are not identical across all groups, countries, and people.
But once “sacred” or “communally important” is proven, the
claiming party must then show that the cultural object is used “as
part of that community’s traditional or ritual use.”158 Where the
cultural object is not for ritual use, then it must be for traditional use.
Traditional use can be more difficult to establish than ritual use
because the object must not only be for traditional use, it must also
be “communally important.” As O’Keefe notes, this may be highly
problematic for cultural objects used every day by a particular
family rather than by the community.159 These highly specific
definitions exemplify the international legal frameworks that
maintain the logic of the colonizer but within which source groups
and states must navigate and fit their claims.
In other contexts, the use of term “culturally significant” to
designate which cultural objects are fair game for claims for
repatriation or return present the same uncomfortable reality.
Between possessing institutions and individuals there is a vast
difference of opinion regarding what is “culturally significant.”160
In the context of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, there are no
154
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provisions that provide for the competence of the claimant state to
identify the cultural objects or property that are “culturally
significant” to it. Instead, the court that assesses a claim is left with
a margin of discretion that may be problematic where the court in
question (or the state within which the claim is brought) does not
view the object as culturally significant or views it simply as a
commodity to be freely traded on the market.161
Peru’s claim against Yale for the return of artifacts from Machu
Picchu is one example of the barriers encountered due to the
imposition of limitation periods. Since Peru had already made a
formal demand for the return of these objects in the 1920s, which
Yale had refused, it became apparent that the seventy-year time
period that had elapsed since the initial demand and the recent claim
for the return of these objects would be problematic due to the threeyear statute of limitations applicable to replevin actions.162 In order
to overcome these barriers—as will be discussed subsequently in a
later section—extralegal strategies including international
awareness-raising and public shaming were employed.163
2. Time Domestically: Canada
Canada’s heritage conservation legislation largely falls within
the jurisdiction of the provinces and thus differs from province to
province—the same applies to provincial legislation regarding
limitation of actions legislation.164 As discussed above in relation to
limitation periods in most common law jurisdictions, limitation
periods usually begin at the date of wrongful removal of the cultural
object. Again, the general principle of fairness is applied in order to
safeguard possessors of an object from a perpetual threat of being
sued for the object in question.
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The same justifications exist at the provincial level for the
imposition of time limitations: certainty of title, timely settlement of
disputes, and the protection of good-faith innocent purchasers.165
Some exceptions exist in repatriation claims in order to account for
the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action such that the
limitation period will not begin until the date upon which the fraud
was discovered or ought to have been discovered. But this does not
fully account for changes in Aboriginal rights law and the ability to
effectively determine when Aboriginal claimants knew or
reasonably ought to have known about their ownership rights over a
particular object.166 When a limitation period runs out and does not
fall under an exception, the claimant(s) will have their right to
ownership extinguished—which, in some cases, may ultimately
indirectly extinguish a common law Aboriginal right to cultural
property.167
B. Ownership and Property
Even if the barriers posed by limitation periods are overcome,
claims to ownership and possession remain a barrier for a number
of reasons that largely arise from differing perceptions or
understanding of ownership and property.168
1. Identifying Origins and Owners
As time passes, ownership and the provenance of a removed
cultural object become increasingly difficult to trace. The chain of
title is obscured as the object is traded from party to party.169 The
evidence needed to demonstrate provenance may not be sufficient
in proceedings before the courts in the jurisdiction where the object
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is currently held and may ultimately make the return of objects
impossible.170
In a dispute for the return of pre-Columbian artifacts seized by
United States Customs from a private individual, the Government of
Peru had to prove that it was the legal owner of the claimed objects
at the time that the objects were removed.171 Since Peru could only
prove national ownership of cultural property from 1929 forward,
their claim was unsuccessful.172
The claimant must be able to show a past-present continuity, on
a balance of probabilities, which may be straightforward where
claims are made for objects from a well-documented or well-known
period of time.173 However, this is not the case with many claims,
and as time passes it becomes increasingly difficult to establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt, a past-present continuity.174
A dearth of evidence is also problematic for claims for objects
that were exported illegally or secretly, as it is difficult to have
sufficient evidence to prove ownership and the provenance of these
illegally exported objects.175
Additionally, the group that initially created the cultural object,
or the culture that the object can be sourced to, may no longer remain
as a recognizable entity—thus breaking the continuity of title. An
example of this is the Nok civilization and Nok art.176 The Nigerian
government lays claim to these cultural items because the Nok
civilization once existed within what is now Nigeria.
The claim for objects that embody a particular culture carries
additional unique challenges related to the movable nature of the
170
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cultural objects in question. Determining which culture an object
embodies can be problematic since the object could quite easily have
been transferred between groups or have been left behind and
appropriated by incoming conquering or occupying groups.
2. Differing Concepts of Ownership and Property
Beginning with Aboriginal property, concepts of property differ
from mainstream Western and Eurocentric notions of private
property where, at base, there exists the assumption that all property
may be owned by an individual.177 As Brian Tamanaha describes,
property ownership is a common space of legal pluralistic clashes
between Western and Eurocentric norms, on the one hand, and nonWestern and non-Eurocentric, on the other.178 Other ways of
envisioning property—such as communal ownership or collective
ownership—create problems in claims for repatriation and return as
they make it more difficult to frame a claim within the available
legal frameworks that import basic assumptions regarding what is
acceptable evidence of ownership, chain of title, and possession.
Collective ownership, for example, focuses on the interests of
the community, and the community that owns property, rather than
the individual. However, within the collective, particular individuals
may benefit from more extensive rights or responsibilities for
portions of the property that are otherwise held collectively. An
example would be religious leaders within the collectivity.179
Communal ownership is much the same as collective ownership, but
lacks the possibility for particular individuals to benefit from the
superior right outlined above.180
In addition, the buying and selling of property—which is such
an assumed reality within Western and Eurocentric property
norms—do not necessarily carry an equivalent notion or importance
within customary normative systems.181 This can make it difficult
when entering into litigation that requires conventional evidence of
ownership as well as market values.
177
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Property and ownership analogies may certainly be drawn with
concepts not unfamiliar to those within dominant legal
frameworks,182 but whether or not the analogies are sufficient to
communicate alternate conceptions, we are still left with simply
another means of forcing Aboriginal concepts of property into
Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks.183
Domestic repatriation claims are the most palpable examples of
the problems that arise when subaltern source groups have
conceptions of ownership that differ from the dominant notions of
ownership and property of the formal legal frameworks of the
country in which these groups find themselves.184 In Canada, a good
example of the incongruence between ownership as structured
within Western legal frameworks and non-Western perspectives is
the Echo Mask—the return of which was claimed by the Nuxalk
Nation.185 According to the laws of the Nuxalk Nation, the mask
“belongs to the family which has the custody of it and the culture of
the mask belongs to the Nation. A person in the family holds the
mask for the family and all people [and is the keeper] of it.”186 The
two do not fit together when this description of “ownership” forms
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part of a claim for repatriation structured within Western legal
frameworks and notions of ownership.187
Canada, and the United States, have mechanisms that can be
described as a “blended approach” in accounting for the legal
pluralistic aspect of repatriation claims from Aboriginal groups
within state borders.188 Due to the sui generis (unique or “of its own
kind”) status of Aboriginal rights in Canada, repatriation claims in
Canadian courts consider Aboriginal perspectives on ownership and
property along with the common-law principles of property law and
contract law that characterize the Canadian formal legal
framework.189 Where the common law principle of nemo dat quod
non habet (an individual cannot transfer more rights in property
beyond what the individual has) operates by limiting the transfer or
sale of an object over which the transferor has not acquired good
title, Canadian courts determine the acquisition of good title and
legitimate transfer of property according to Aboriginal laws and
customs.190 It bears noting that even with acknowledgement of
Aboriginal laws and customs, there are certain legislated exceptions
to the nemo dat rule—such as those arising from limitations periods
in dealing with the purchase and sale of objects in an open market.191
Internationally, there are also differences between civil and
common law jurisdictions where conflict of law issues arise related
to the ability to acquire good title to a stolen object. In common law
jurisdictions like Canada, the United States, England, Australia, and
so on, a thief cannot acquire good title and is not able to pass good
title to a purchaser even if the purchase is done in good faith (nemo
dat quod non habet). But, in contrast, in civil law jurisdictions such
as France, Italy, and Spain, a bona fide purchaser can acquire good
title—although the conditions for this will vary between
jurisdictions.192
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In a cross-border context, the laws that will apply in a claim for
the return of an object may not be the laws of the court where the
claim is being heard—which may lead to the clash between different
conceptions of ownership and title. For example, where a court
applies the lex rei sitae to a claim for the return of an object,
determining the law of the place where the object was located when
good title was acquired will depend on perceptions of how and when
good title can in fact be acquired.193 This will ultimately affect the
success of a claim for the return of an object. Both source groups
and source states face this barrier.
C. The Domestic Laws of Source and Destination Countries
Repatriation and return mechanisms usually refer to the export
and cultural heritage laws in place in the country of origin at the time
of the alleged removal of the cultural object and the agreements in
place between the countries in question when the object was
removed. This is problematic on a number of fronts. In the context
of colonization, the formal laws of a source country are often based
on Western or Eurocentric models and often do not effectively
account for divergent notions of property and ownership of
subaltern groups within the state’s borders. But at an even more
basic level, in dealing with the laws in place at the time of the
object’s removal, a source country’s export or cultural heritage laws
frequently pose a barrier in formulating a claim for an object’s return
since the source state may not have had applicable laws dealing with
the export of cultural objects—whether this is because the state was
not a state at the time of the object’s removal or whether these laws
were not yet created. Or, if the state was in existence at the time of
removal and even may have had relevant laws in place, it is likely
that these laws were inadequate to prevent the export and illicit
removal of the object—often due to colonial rule unconcerned with
such matters. Further, current agreements in place between the
countries in question may not yet have been created and agreed upon
at that point in time; or applicable international mechanisms for
return and repatriation may not have been in force at the time of the
object’s removal.
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Peru has faced numerous difficulties in claiming the return of
items that were removed before laws relating to cultural heritage
were in place as well as difficulties due to the inadequacy of these
laws even when they came into effect. In Peru v. Johnson, for
example, the claimant was unable to successfully prove its
ownership of the removed objects under its own heritage laws in
place at the time of export, which was exacerbated by the claimant’s
inability to ascertain the exact date of removal in order to establish
the precise laws that would have been applied at the time of the
removal of the objects.194 In penning the decision, Judge Gray notes,
with reference to United States v. McClain, that while “export
restrictions constitute the police power of a state; ‘[t]hey do not
create ‘ownership’ in the state’.”195 And referring to a further
decision in United States v. McClain, Judge Gray also finds that
even if Peru has considered itself the owner of the cultural objects
in question, “It has not expressed that view with sufficient clarity to
survive translation into terms understandable by and binding upon
American citizens.”196 Ultimately, Peru’s claim for the return of the
Pre-Columbian artifacts was denied.
In addition, Yale stubbornly resisted Peru’s attempts to have the
cultural objects returned that were removed from Machu Picchu at
various points in time by insisting that its legal title to the objects
was based on the version of Peru’s civil code in force at the time of
removal of the objects.197 While the objects have now been returned,
the reliance on the laws in place in the source country at the time of
removal were circumvented through extralegal means, which will
be discussed in subsequent sections, rather than rethought.
In dealing with the return of removed cultural material in an
international context, source groups and countries are also
dependent upon the domestic laws of the destination country
regarding private international law or conflict of laws in terms of
194
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which country’s laws will ultimately apply to the claim for the
returned cultural object.198 Numerous complicated and seemingly
unjust situations may occur through the application of conflict of
laws rules. These complications may occur where, for example, a
claimant is the victim of the illicit removal of a cultural object to a
foreign jurisdiction; and when the object is eventually located and
the case is tried in the claimant’s local court, the claimant is unable
to recover the object in question because the local court applies the
law of the foreign jurisdiction, which may protect the rights of a
good faith purchaser over those of the claimant.199
1. Canada’s Domestic Laws as Barrier
In Canada, certain categories of cultural property are under the
control of the CPEIA, which limits the right to sell and trade cultural
property that is privately owned.200 The limit is intended to keep a
balance between private interests and the public interest of ensuring
nationally important cultural objects remain within Canada’s
borders.201 The Cultural Property Export Control List (“Export
Control List”) may include objects made by an individual at least
fifty years ago, but who is presently no longer alive.202 In order to
export objects within this category, an application must be submitted
and is subject to the review expert examiners who, according to
section 11(1) are to decide:
(a) whether that object is of outstanding significance
by reason of its close association with Canadian
history or national life, its aesthetic qualities, or its
value in the study of the arts or sciences; and
(b) whether the object is of such a degree of national
importance that its loss to Canada would
significantly diminish the national heritage.203
If the object fits under this category, then the export permit will
be denied, though the exporter may still make an appeal to the
198
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Review Board.204 Nonetheless, the Review Board can delay the
export of the object for two to six months in order to give Canadian
institutions and public authorities—such as museums and
galleries—the opportunity to prevent the export of the object
through purchase.205 This mechanism has been helpful in the past
for First Nations groups to discover and prevent the export of potent
cultural objects.206 The CPEIA further provides for loans and grants
that can be applied for by Canadian institutions and public
authorities in order to aid in the purchase of these objects.207
While the CPEIA may be helpful in preventing further loss of
important cultural objects, the past removal of objects—whether
they were exported before effective export laws were in place or
whether they were removed and still remain in Canada—are
generally beyond the non-retroactive scope of the Act. This is the
case unless the object in question becomes the object of an
application for an export permit or is an illegally exported object
from another state that is subsequently imported into Canada.208 But
even then, the CPEIA, as well as Canada’s cultural heritage laws in
general, certainly do not effectively address all situations.
For example, in R v. Heller, the government of Nigeria tried to
recover a Nok artifact illegally exported from Nigeria that had been
imported into Canada.209 Even though the substance of the case was
sound and both Nigeria and Canada were parties to the 1970
UNESCO Convention, the case ultimately failed in the Alberta
Provincial Court. In applying Article 7 of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention as incorporated into Canadian law, Justice Stevenson
ruled that Nigeria was unable to secure the return of the object
because sufficient evidence could not be adduced to satisfy the
requirements of Canadian law to establish that the object had been
removed from Nigeria after June 28, 1978—the date upon which
Canada and Nigeria became parties to the UNESCO Convention,
204
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thus entering into the applied cultural property agreement between
the two countries.210 As a result, the Convention was deemed to be
inapplicable.211
The result had significant cost ramifications for Nigeria and was
also costly due to the resources needed to pursue this type of claim
in foreign courts.212 Whether or not the object was in fact removed
before or after June 28, 1978, this case demonstrates the difficulties
faced when international claims are made—difficulties that have
not, as seen above, been remedied by the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.
The CPEIA is also subject to misuse and manipulation in a
number of ways, such as by those who deal in the market of cultural
objects who may be able to artificially inflate the price of the objects
within Canada by inventing foreign markets, buyers, or prices,
which exacerbates the fact that groups must purchase what was
wrongfully removed from them in the first place.213
D. Cost
The costs of repatriation and return are significant. States may
be able to absorb the costs involved with repatriation, but these costs
may be beyond the means of indigenous groups seeking the
repatriation and return of cultural objects.
Costs are manifested in a number of ways, which are magnified
in the international context. The sources of these costs, to name just
a few, include: the legal costs associated with commencing and
maintaining court proceedings in the country where the object is
currently found; traveling necessary to visit the sites where the
removed objects are located in order to ascertain their origin and
identity as well as conduct research; information compiled by
210
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researchers and experts, which also often involves the need for
translators; and costs resulting from the commodification of potent
cultural objects that must be purchased in order to secure their return
can be unaffordable.214 Moreover, if a claim is successful, the costs
of transporting the cultural objects are high and the return of these
objects often requires the construction of special facilities.215
1. Litigation and Negotiation Costs
International claims for the return of potent cultural objects,
especially where international litigation is involved, are inevitably
expensive and complex—leading experts to suggest that these sorts
of claims be seen as a last recourse.216
In Canada, even though negotiation may provide a less costly
alternative for Aboriginal groups in resolving repatriation claims
than litigation,217 its processes can still be unrealistically
unaffordable and additionally impracticable where successful
negotiation often depends on agreeing to the imposition of costly
conditions of return.218 Not every claimant group has the financial
resources to interact within the legal or business infrastructure
expected by the possessor of their potent object.
2. Housing Costs
International negotiations for the return of objects may also
impose conditions requiring an environmentally controlled facility
(essentially, a museum-like facility) as part of the agreement for the
return of the cultural object in question.
For example, housing the G’psgolox memorial pole in a properly
climate-controlled environment was one of the costly conditions
initially imposed upon the Haisla Nation in their claim for its return
from the Swedish Museum of Ethnography.219 Even though the
Haisla claimants were not opposed to the rationale behind the
214
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condition, and the pole was eventually returned while they were still
raising funds to create a proper facility,220 the costs of constructing
such facilities are a financial burden faced by many source groups
in order to house returned cultural objects illicitly removed from
their original source.
Another example is the Nisga’a Foundation’s fundraising
campaign in order to create the Nisga’a Museum and Cultural
Center to house the objects and human remains for which the
Nisga’a have successfully negotiated a repatriation agreement with
the Canadian Museum of Civilization (now known as the Canadian
Museum of History) and the Royal British Columbia Museum.221
While the repatriation agreement imposes no conditions on the
Nisga’a, as with the Haisla, the Nisga’a recognize the merits of
keeping certain potent cultural objects within a museum-type venue.
Nonetheless, this still increases the costs that must be faced in
repatriating cultural objects, and imposes the Western and
Eurocentric values of preservation demands upon claimant groups.
While the CPEIA may provide grants or loans to aid in the cost
of repatriation or return internationally, these grants often have their
own cost ramifications. Parallel to the terms imposed by the
possessing party in many negotiations for return, CPEIA grants may
also contain terms that dictate that the objects in question be kept in
a locale that meets preservation specifications as well as public
access requirements, which are not usually readily available unless
claimants collaborate with museums, galleries, banks, and so on.222
This was the case with the grant given to the Nuxalk for the return
of the Echo Mask.223 In order to meet the stipulations that the mask
be kept in environmentally controlled case and in a secure but public
facility, the Echo Mask remains housed in a bank near the Nuxalk
reserve. It will remain there until enough money has been raised to
construct and complete a facility on the reserve that meets these
stipulations.224 This is an example of how not every claimant group
220
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has the financial resources to replicate the preservation conditions
the group that had previously possessed the potent object had
instituted (and then imposed upon the claimant group as a part of the
grant needed to have the object returned).
3. Cost of Commodification
Cultural objects command a high price on the international art
market, which is highly problematic for source groups when they do
not have access to extensive funds to repurchase the object.225 Even
where there may be some recourse to the state within which the
group is found—such as the loans or grants that can be applied for
by Canadian institutions and public authorities in Canada under the
CPEIA—or through private philanthropy, these forms of funding for
the return of cultural objects are still dependent on the colonizing
state.
There are numerous examples of the costly price tags faced in
securing the return of potent cultural objects. To name a few, the
U’mista Cultural Society (Kwakwaka’wakwa First Nations) faced a
price tag of $30,000 (USD) in exchange for the return of the Nowell
blanket from a private gallery in Ontario,226 and the Nuxalk First
Nations faced a price tag of $200,000 (Can) for the return of the
Echo Mask in the possession of an art dealer, even though the mask
was not a commodifiable object according to Nuxalk law.227
The U’mista Cultural Society attempted to prevent the export
and secure the return of a blanket belonging to Chief Charles
Nowell. The export eventually transpired despite their efforts, and
the Nowell blanket went up for auction at Sotheby’s in New York.228
Through CPEIA grants, the U’mista were able to bid a maximum of
$21,500 (USD), but they were outbid by a private gallery in Ontario
that bid $24,500 (USD).229 Eventually the Ontario gallery sold the
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Nowell blanket back to the U’mista for $30,000 (USD) and turned
a $5,500 (USD) profit on its purchase.230
Turning to the Nuxalk Echo Mask, “under the laws of the
Nuxalk Nation, the [Echo Mask] and the prerogatives associated
with it may only be transferred at a potlatch under the witness of the
community” and “[t]he mask cannot be sold by an individual and is
to stay in the community for use in potlatches.”231 Even though the
Echo Mask, according to Nuxalk law, cannot be sold, in the 1980s
the elderly woman in possession of the mask was convinced by an
art dealer to sell him the mask for $35,000 (Can).232 The dealer later
applied for an export permit under Canada’s CPEIA but his
application for the permit was ultimately delayed after the Nuxalk
Nation and other sympathizers were able to secure an injunction.233
The return of the mask was eventually negotiated out of court, but
the art dealer’s claims of legitimate title to the mask could not be
circumvented by the Nuxalk and they ultimately had to face the price
tag of $200,000 (Can) placed on the object by the art dealer.234
VI. CURRENT LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL STRATEGIES FOR
OVERCOMING BARRIERS: COLONIALISM MAINTAINED AND
REPLICATED
The legal and cost barriers demonstrate how international and
domestic laws are failing to effectively address legitimate claims for
the repatriation and return of cultural objects and have led claimants
to turn to extralegal strategies in the hopes of success. Yet even these
extralegal strategies operate within Western and Eurocentric
frameworks and the overarching problematic attribution of market
value to invaluable potent cultural objects through commodification.
Commodification is the most significant relic of colonialism faced
in claims for repatriation and return since it is present both within
230
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the barriers that exist in formulating claims for repatriation as well
as the attempts to overcome these barriers.
Currently, the appeal to "public feeling" is a popular and
increasingly successful mechanism used by subaltern cultural
groups and source states in order to overcome the barriers to
repatriation and return identified above.235 Cooperation and
mediation between museums and those claiming repatriation or
return have also been successful.236 In addition to suggestions to
alter aspects of the current legal frameworks, non-legal and soft-law
mechanism may additionally aid in mitigating the barriers to
repatriation and return.237
A. Legal Strategies to Circumvent the Barriers
While judicial interpretation that considers the greater social
context and merits of a claim may yield positive results in
overcoming some of the challenges posed by barriers such as
limitations legislation,238 this does not speak to the removal of
continued imposition of Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks
on claims for repatriation or return.239 Simply removing time
limitations for reclaiming illicitly removed objects of a particular
cultural value and significance is one suggestion provided to break
down the time barrier for reclaiming illicitly removed objects of a
235
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particular cultural value and significance.240 But the removal of time
limitations is just one piece of the puzzle and does not truly progress
beyond a Western and Eurocentric assessment of which objects are
qualified as particularly valuable and significant.
Additionally, unless specifically addressed by legislation, even
if limitation periods were removed, the application of the doctrine
of laches, based in equity, may nonetheless apply.241 If a delay in
reclaiming is ruled as inexcusable or as due to the acquiescence on
the part of the delaying party, the reasonable reliance of the current
possessor may be seen as requiring protection.242 But since the
doctrine of laches is based in equity, this may control for its unjust
application.
Other experts focus on re-conceptualizing ownership and
property rights in order to better account for differing iterations of
these concepts that are found in source cultural groups and
nations.243 This potential solution, while recognizing the merits of
legal pluralism, only seeks to better account for notions of
ownership and property rights that “do not fit.”
At least in the domestic Canadian context, the use of customary
law can be useful in dealing with repatriation claims in terms of
demonstrating Aboriginal ownership or control over cultural
objects.244 But the utility of these approaches may be limited to
disputes within claimant groups unless they are truly recognized
through enabling legislation.245 In addition, the applicability of
customary law in dealing with non-Aboriginal non-governmental
parties would often still have to be framed through the Western and
Eurocentric adversarial model in order to account for the legal
240
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traditions of both parties.246 Even if an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism were used to better represent the interests of claimant
groups, conflicting notions of legal concepts, such as property,
would remain between the parties to the dispute.247
Internationally, since Aboriginal groups within a country do not
have standing to bring claims internationally, the national
government of the state within which the group finds itself must
instead present the claim. Although customary law might be
referenced by the state in addressing ownership or control of a
claimed cultural object, state law will generally prevail.248
B. Extralegal Strategies to Circumvent the Barriers
1. Appeals to "Public Feelings"
Appeals to “public feeling,” and the shaming of institutions and
states where removed cultural objects are located, are generally
accomplished through awareness-raising campaigns. Journalists,
international media, and famous or influential individuals then pick
up these campaigns. This will ideally lead to pressure on state
governments and institutions that face reclamation claims to take
action and recognize these claims or remove the barriers blocking
claims already in progress. There is also the financial dimension to
appeals to public feeling. Benefactors may aid in remedying the cost
barrier involved in repatriation and return—whether aiding in the
purchase of an object where that is one of the conditions of return,
or by becoming the highest bidder at the sale of objects at an auction
house and then donating the potent objects in question to the
claiming source group.
What has been termed “ethics-based repatriation” is observable
in the dispute that continued for years between the Peruvian
government and Yale University over the return of cultural objects
comprising numerous collections removed from Machu Picchu at
different points in time and held at Yale.249 The tides began to finally
turn in Peru’s favor when the international media took notice after
246

Id. at 363. See also FORREST, supra note 1, at 148–49.
Zlotkin, supra note 244, at 366.
248
Id. at 363–64.
249
Alderman, supra note 162.
247

2016]

Res Extra Commercium and the Barriers Faced

353

Peru mounted an awareness-raising social and political campaign
involving demonstrations held in Peru’s two largest cities, Lima and
Cuzco, and after a formal request by Peru’s President to United
States President Barack Obama for his help.250 This even led nine
Peruvians running in the New York Marathon to don t-shirts in
support of Peru’s requests for the return of the Machu Picchu
artifacts and inspired Yale alumni to take up a letter-writing
campaign.251 Ultimately, this resulted in the public shaming of Yale
and, while Yale first held strong in its refusal to return the objects,
eventually ceded to Peru’s requests, leading to the return of the
entire 1912 and 1916 collections in time for the 100th anniversary
of American explorer (and later United States Senator and Governor
of Connecticut) Hiram Bingham III’s arrival in (or, in colonizing
terms, his “discovery of”) Machu Picchu.252
Within Canada’s domestic context, the attention paid by
journalists and international media to the U’mista Cultural Society
(Kwakwa̱ ka̱ ʼwakwa First Nations) claim for the return of a
Transformation Mask from the British Museum led to a shift in the
uncompromising position of both parties and eventual resolution of
the dispute via a long-term loan of the Transformation Mask and its
relocation to the U’mista Cultural Center.253
Where public funding—for example, through the CPEIA—
provides a means to waylay some of the costs for claimants to have
their potent cultural objects returned to them through purchase,
increasingly private philanthropy is providing an alternate means of
funding these purchases.254 For example, France’s Drouot auction
house recently sold dozens of sacred ceremonial masks and hoods
in December of 2013, despite the Hopi and San Carlos Apache
tribes’ attempts in court to block the sale of the masks and the United
States Embassy’s requests for delaying the sale on behalf of the Hopi
and San Carlos Apache so that the tribes could identify whether they
250
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could formulate a claim pursuant to the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.255
Numerous barriers blocked Hopi efforts to reclaim the masks,
such as difficulty in proving the “ownership” or provenance of the
masks,256 but private philanthropy ultimately enabled a return of
some of the masks despite the barriers faced. Even though the masks
sold quickly at auction for approximately $1.6 million (USD) to the
dismay of the claimants, it turned out that the Annenberg
Foundation had noticed the plight of the Hopi and San Carlos
Apache tribes in their struggle to have these potent cultural objects
returned, and had secretly bought up many of these important
cultural objects in order to return them to their place of origin in
Arizona.257
2. The “Caring-and-Sharing,” or Collaborative Approach
The Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and
Transfer of Cultural Material (“Principles”), developed by the
International Law Association’s Cultural Heritage Law Committee,
are a mechanism specifically targeted at the avoidance and
resolution of disputes related to cultural property.258 The
International Law Association adopted the Principles in 2006 with
the intent of having the Principles as an international minimum
standard.259 Their goal is to encourage cooperation, collaboration,
and the establishment of a middle ground between parties with
competing claims as well as a focus on the sharing of cultural
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heritage objects.260 The emphasis is on the protection and interests
of the object itself rather than on the competing claims to the
object.261 The Principles also address alternatives to the direct return
of cultural objects through mechanisms like loaning the object,
creating a replica, and sharing in the management and control of the
cultural object in question.262
An example of this collaborative approach is the return of the
G’psgolox totem pole from the Museum of Ethnography in
Stockholm to the Haisla Nation on the Northern coast of British
Columbia.263 The return of the pole was conditional upon its
placement in a state-of-the-art climate controlled facility, which did
not exist at the time and was costly to build, but was nonetheless
agreed upon. The Haisla also carved a replacement replica pole and,
in a gesture of reciprocity, gave it to the Museum of Ethnography as
part of the efforts they undertook to repatriate the pole.264 While
barriers to the return of the pole initially hindered Haisla efforts, the
satisfactory resolution of the conflict over the desired return of the
pole was eventually achieved through use of these methods.
The Principles are progressive in their encouragement of
institutions to work with and respond to requests for the return of
cultural objects from source countries and groups regardless of
whether or not the state within which the institution is located
supports or acknowledges the request.265 As the Principles clearly
target public ownership and collections, they do not address
privately owned and collected objects.266 Although no panacea, in
working around barriers to repatriation and return, cooperation
between interested parties is certainly an accessible and effective
tool.
Where it is impossible to overcome barriers, the last recourse,
linked to the collaborative approach, may be to arrange a loan where
the state or an institution within which a claimant group is located
260
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holds the cultural object. This may also be viewed as an interim
solution, or even one that is in line with alternative views of
ownership. For example, in Canada, if a court finds that a province
has a valid legislative objective, and that this objective is enforced
in a manner that is consistent with its fiduciary obligation, the direct
return of a cultural object to an Aboriginal community may be
refused on face value.267 While it would be unfortunate if the
interests of Aboriginal communities in their cultural objects were to
be placed second to, for example, the interests of the broader
Canadian public in the presentation, protection, or display of these
cultural objects, a co-management or loan arrangement may be a
better alternative than none at all.268
All of these mechanisms, however, are often unpredictable and
unreliable, and the alternatives to direct return of the cultural object,
such as loans, do not necessarily remove the colonial gaze on an
invaluable potent cultural object that must be “borrowed” in order
to return to its rightful home.269 Ultimately, these mechanisms are a
decent last resort, but source countries and source groups should not
be at the mercy of compromise simply because their claims cannot
be fit into Western and Eurocentric frameworks, norms, and
understandings. The bottom line is that most of the suggested
methods of overcoming these barriers to repatriation and return only
serve to further reinforce Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks
and norms since these potential solutions continue to engage with
these same frameworks.270 As such, the most prescient strategy
moving forward would be to step outside of existing frameworks;
question the entire way in which potent cultural objects are currently
perceived through the colonizer’s gaze, and more thoroughly
involve a legal pluralistic approach to better account for the laws
and traditions of source countries and indigenous groups.
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VII. REMOVING THE COLONIZER'S GAZE: NEUTRALIZING
COMMODIFICATION
The barriers to the repatriation and return of cultural objects,
along with current and potential contravening solutions, share a
problematic underlying fixation on Western and Eurocentric notions
of market value that permit a monetary worth to be placed on
cultural objects and leaves them in a commodified state. As noted
previously, cultural objects as potent objects are invaluable to source
states and indigenous groups. Yet even the arguments in support of
repatriation and return are framed within the discourse of value.271
In general, civil law frameworks recognize the notion of
inalienability while common law systems do not.272 However, even
civil law frameworks have not effectively applied this notion to
repatriation and return claims,273 and the notion of the good faith
purchaser often nullifies inalienability.
Western and Eurocentric notions of value imposed on potent
objects within current frameworks for repatriation and return
constitute the colonizer’s gaze and a Gramscian imposition of the
colonizer’s cultural hegemony.274 To respond in a manner more
appropriate to true decolonization (and in better accordance with the
principles laid out in UNDRIP, especially Articles 11 and 12),275
innovative solutions that move beyond the hegemony of dominant
Western and Eurocentric values and legal frameworks must be
sought out. To that end, subsequent to the following situating
discussion of the colonizer’s gaze and commodification, this Article
will next turn to the notion of res extra commercium.
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A. The Commodification of Cultural Objects
The commodification of cultural objects is certainly not a new
concept. Once these objects were subsumed under the colonizer’s
gaze, their commodification quickly occurred as they became highly
sought after curiosities coveted by amateur anthropologists, intrepid
collectors, and museums. But globalization has further led to the
increasing importance of culture as a marketable resource.276
Arjun Appadurai, referring to Igor Kopytoff’s general theory of
commodity pathways, suggests that all things, at some point in their
lives, become commodities.277 Some things, however, such as
sacred things, are “enclaved commodities” and may be precluded
from commodification.278 Appadurai and Kopytoff refer to these
things as “terminal commodities,”279 or “objects which, because of
the context, purpose, and meaning of their production, make only
one journey from production to consumption.”280 Subsequent to this
divergence from the path of commodification, which occurs as soon
as these objects are produced,281 “they are sometimes used in casual
domestic ways, [but] they are never permitted to enter the
commodity state.”282 It is thus impossible for these objects to
subsequently become commodities. Appadurai goes on to explain
that “[w]hat makes them thus decommodified is a complex
understanding of value (in which the aesthetic, the ritual, and the
social come together), and a specific ritual biography.”283 This calls
to mind Welsh’s potent object.284 Appadurai’s and Kopytoff’s views
276
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on commodification also include the element of legal pluralism
required for “terminal commodities” to apply within Western and
Eurocentric frameworks—the diversion of a particular object from
the path of commodification occurs based on the internal norms and
understandings of the particular group within which the object is
produced.285
Beyond direct involvement in the commercial exchange of
potent cultural objects, Sarah Harding suggests that museums are
also involved in the commodification of potent cultural objects
through a parallel structure.286 She explains that, even though
museums would resist being accused of “merchandizing” potent
cultural objects, the very presence of an object in a museum leads to
a spike in its market value and “prestige,” and may even generate a
market for the object in the first place.287 But perhaps the most
inevitable way that museums become involved in the
commodification of a potent cultural object is the price they must
place on an object for insurance purposes.288
In rejecting the commodification of potent cultural objects,
many Aboriginal groups in Canada have argued against the ability
for these objects to exist on the market in the first place through the
establishment of a complete ban on their sale.289 But current
legislative frameworks do not recognize this option and instead
remain structured around the notion that these potent cultural objects
remain a marketable commodity.290 The imposition of
commodification demonstrates the overarching colonial gaze and
the Western and Eurocentric norms that pervade current frameworks
within which claims for repatriation and return must be made.
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Regardless of the laws and traditions of a claimant group, which
may dictate that their potent cultural objects do not carry market
value and thus cannot be sold, claimants are frequently forced to
interact with the commodification of the objects if they wish to have
them returned. They often end up purchasing potent cultural objects
that are not only invaluable to them, but also belong to them and
were wrongfully removed, which many claimants—such as First
Nations groups in Canada—understandably find to be offensive.291
Nonetheless, the market value that these objects now carry to the
purchasing party is an inevitable reality that claims for repatriation
and return must deal with as long as these claims must continue to
be structured within Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks.
Even exercising extralegal strategies does not nullify the
commodification that has been applied to potent cultural objects
once introduced into Western and Eurocentric conceptions. This is
an example of how, in Gramscian terms, “an unjust social
arrangement is internalized and endlessly reinforced.”292
B. Owning as Belonging versus Owning as Property
Brian Noble highlights the difference between practices that
center around “owning as property” and “owning as belonging.”293
This is one of the key elements around which the colonial gaze is
maintained over claims for the return or repatriation of potent
cultural objects. As Noble explains: “‘Owning as property’
describes a system that emphasizes property as a commodity
capable of individual ownership and alienation for the purposes of
resource use and wealth maximization.”294 This system
characterizes the current legal frameworks that exist for framing
claims for repatriation and return, and it is at the heart of most of the
barriers described previously. Additionally, extralegal mechanisms
291
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and other methods that are used or suggested in order to circumvent
these barriers either reinforce the misapplication of
commodification to potent cultural objects or must still function
within this system.
In contrast, Noble describes “owning as belonging” as a system
that views and structures transactions differently. Within this nonWestern, non-Eurocentric, and often subaltern system is the
assumption that there is an “inextricable connection between people
and the material and intangible world.”295 That is, people “belong
indivisibly to their cultural property.”296 In terms of the
“transaction,” there is a palpable sense of non-severability between
people and objects, inalienable reciprocity, and an implicit
expectation of exchange and return. This is in contrast to the
Western perception of the transaction that centers around alienable
“property,” trade, and the purchase of consumables with money.297
Within systems that view owning as belonging, transactions
involving potent cultural objects seek to build and reinforce
“relationships of respect and responsibility between people.”298
C. Gramsci and the Imposition of the Colonizer’s Cultural
Hegemony
The notion of hegemony is helpful in addressing the dominant
legal frameworks that must be navigated in claims for repatriation
or return; “[I]t is a critical tool that generates profound insights about
the law’s ability to induce submission to a dominant worldview.”299
In applying this notion to the legal frameworks at play in claims for
repatriation and return, it is helpful to follow Douglas Litowitz’s
recasting of Gramscian hegemony.300 Litowitz seeks to modernize
Gramsci’s initial iteration of hegemony by arguing that hegemony
should be perceived as a dominant code or “as a mechanism for the
constitution of a dominant rationality that has become so
commonsensical that it hardly appears worthy of challenge”—rather
than as domination by a particular class.301
295
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In this manner, the way in which Western and Eurocentric
principles of property law and notions of ownership exist as
unavoidable obstacles for the return and repatriation claims of
source groups speaks to the social control embodied by hegemony;
“It involves subduing and co-opting dissenting voices through subtle
dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and
natural, to the point where the dominant beliefs and practices
become an intractable component of common sense.”302
In order to identify the hegemony operating within claims for
the repatriation and return of potent cultural objects, the entire
system must be questioned. “[H]egemony is diagnosed through a
kind of social criticism where we stand outside of our practices and
institutions and see that they are one-sided to an extent that we did
not recognize while we were operating within their boundaries.”303
In particular, where commodification of these potent cultural objects
within the current dominant legal framework and free market system
proves to be such a central and problematic element, then the
commodifying element must be addressed, resisted, and removed. If
commodification continues to be accepted in this context, then
claims for and disputes over potent cultural objects will continue to
be framed “in the dominant language of the legal system at the time,
thereby extending the system.”304
D. The Transsystemic Approach as Means of Removing the
Colonizer’s Gaze and Addressing Cultural Hegemony
In order to divorce claims for repatriation and return from the
hegemony of dominant Western and Eurocentric frameworks, it is
necessary to step outside of these frameworks and the “common
sense” of the dominant worldview that accepts the commodification
of potent cultural objects. This can be done through a transsystemic
approach that reaches under the law in order to excavate notions that
carry currency across the boundaries of different legal frameworks
and disregards any hierarchical ordering or valuation that may be
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accorded to various systems.305 A transsystemic methodology
displaces and deconstructs legal traditions in a manner that moves
beyond comparative law.306 By examining the foundations that
underlie discrete legal frameworks, a more complete understanding
of their interrelationship can be gained.307 This is helpful in moving
beyond the hegemonic restraints of the dominant legal frameworks
at play.
1. Applying Transsystemic: Res Extra Commercium, Res Divini
Juris, and Res Sacrae
The transsystemic methodology employed for the present
purposes turns to Roman law and the notion of res extra
commercium. As Rudolph Sohm writes, within the legal framework
dealing with “things,” the Roman term “res” refers to anything that
could comprise part of an individual’s property and “is a material
object which admits of human dominion and has an independent
existence as a whole complete in itself.”308 This is then divided into
different kinds of “things.” One of these categories, res extra
commercium (reminiscent of Appadurai’s and Kopytoff’s notion of
“terminal commodities”),309 refers to things that “are prevented by
a rule of law from being the objects of private rights” and thus are
“outside of the commercial world” and not subject to the transfer of
private rights in the object from one individual to another—meaning
that never within the object’s life can it be legally bought or sold.310
In addition, the object accorded res extra commercium status
escapes acquisitive prescription, laches, and statutes of limitation.311
The types of objects falling into this category are further divided
into three classes: res divini juris, res publicae, and res omnium
communes. Of particular relevance for the present discussion is res
305
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divini juris, which is in turn divided into res sacrae ("things
dedicated to the gods, [i.e.,] temples and altars"), res sanctae
("things enjoying the special protection of the gods, [i.e.,] the walls
of Rome"), and res religiosae ("things dedicated to the dii Manes”—
the spirits of the deceased—[i.e.,] burial grounds).312 Within this
context, turning back to potent cultural object and Noble’s
description of “ownership as belonging” rather than “ownership as
property,” a potent cultural object would fall under the classification
of one of the three categories of res divini juris listed above—a thing
that cannot be subject to private rights, and as a result, cannot be
subject to the transfer of these rights due to its classification.313
VIII. HINTS OF RES EXTRA COMMERCIUM
A. Res Extra Commercium in the International Context
Internationally, res extra commercium status is often accorded
to cultural objects in Europe.314 The res extra commercium status of
res divini juris identified “things” can be observed in the notions of
imprescriptibility and inalienability of certain objects that are
common within the legal frameworks of civil jurisdictions, the 1970
UNESCO Convention, and very stringently in the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention.315 Referring to a cultural object as inalienable or
imprescriptible indicates that the object is of such great importance
that it cannot be transferred. The state that has the imprescriptible or
inalienable right over the object cannot be alienated from its rights—
no third party, regardless of whether or not they are in good faith,
can achieve ownership in any way including short- or long-term
possession.316
In terms of inalienability provisions, Article 13(d) of the 1970
UNESCO Convention provides:
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The States Parties to this Convention also undertake,
consistent with the laws of each State:
....
(d) to recognize the indefeasible right of each State
Party to this Convention to classify and declare
certain cultural property as inalienable which should
therefore ipso facto not be exported, and to facilitate
recovery of such property by the State concerned in
cases where it has been exported.317
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention addresses this same notion in
Article 3, and Article 3(4) is the closest the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention comes to a res extra commercium regime; but is, as
Stamatoudi suggests, “not close enough”318:
[A] claim for restitution of a cultural object forming
an integral part of an identified monument or
archaeological site, or belonging to a public
collection, shall not be subject to time limitations
other than a period of three years from the time when
the claimant knew the location of the cultural object
and the identity of its possessor.319
The removal of time limitations is subject to the caveat in Article
3(5) that allows for a party to unilaterally impose a seventy-five year
time limit from when the claimant became aware of the location.320
In addition, there is limited acknowledgment of the many objects
that a state may consider as potent and wish to have categorized
under this protected status.321
With regard to the provisions that deal with the return of illegally
exported cultural objects that may fall under protected status, Article
7(1) specifies that these return provisions will not apply where:
(a) the export of a cultural object is no longer illegal
at the time at which the return is requested; or
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(b) the object was exported during the lifetime of the
person who created it or within a period of fifty years
following the death of that person.322
But Article 7(2) recognizes the effects of this on indigenous
source groups by providing a caveat to the exception:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph
(b) of the preceding paragraph, the provisions of this
Chapter shall apply where a cultural object was made
by a member or members of a tribal or indigenous
community for traditional or ritual use by that
community and the object will be returned to that
community.323
Here the terms “traditional” and “ritual” will not necessarily
encompass all claims, as they maintain the logic of the colonizer and
do not account for internal group norms and definitions of what
constitutes an object that should fall under this status. Ultimately,
the designation of traditional or ritual will be at the discretion of the
court before which a claim is brought.324
More importantly, these remain incomplete applications of res
extra commericum since the element of assigned market value to
cultural objects remains, and the interests of the good faith purchaser
is paramount. For example, 1970 UNESCO Convention allows for
the compensation of purchasers in good faith at Article 7(b)(ii):
[A]t the request of the State Party of origin, to take
appropriate steps to recover and return any such
cultural property imported after the entry into force
of this Convention in both States concerned,
provided, however, that the requesting State shall
pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or
to a person who has valid title to that property.
Requests for recovery and return shall be made
through diplomatic offices. The requesting Party
shall furnish, at its expense, the documentation and
other evidence necessary to establish its claim for
322
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recovery and return. The Parties shall impose no
customs duties or other charges upon cultural
property returned pursuant to this Article. All
expenses incident to the return and delivery of the
cultural property shall be borne by the requesting
Party.325
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention also suffers from an
incomplete application of res extra commercium. For example, even
though it acknowledges the “sacred or communally important
cultural object” and the importance of “traditional and ritual use,” it
still applies a time limitation to claims for the return of the object—
although the time limitation is extended for this category of
objects.326 Additionally, the good faith purchaser remains
protected.327
B. Res Extra Commercium in Civil Law Jurisdictions
Turning to civil law jurisdictions, several countries acknowledge
a res extra commercium regime. The French civil code provides that
a good faith purchaser may have to return cultural objects purchased
without receiving compensation if a dispossessed owner acts
quickly enough in reclaiming the objects in question.328 While
Greek law allows for a good faith purchaser to become the owner
after the passage of time subsequent to ordinary acquisition by
possession,329 a limited application of res extra commercium
nonetheless appears in Article 21(1) of Law 3028/2202: “Movable
ancient monuments dating up to 1453 belong to the State in terms
of ownership and possession, are imprescriptible and extra
commercium according to Article 966 of the Civil Code.”330 German
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law also recognizes the concept of res sacrae in relation to objects
that are used for the purpose of religious worship.331
C. Res Extra Commercium in Common Law Jurisdictions
An example of the partial application of res extra commercium
within a common law jurisdiction is New Zealand’s Protected
Objects Act of 1975.332 This Act deals with the market for Maori
artifacts within New Zealand and restricts the sale of these objects
to registered collectors.333 Residents of New Zealand who were
already in possession of a Maori cultural object, or numerous
objects, before the commencement of the Act have to register as
collectors if they wish to acquire more objects.334 Since the Act is
not retrospective, objects within private collections may remain
sequestered from claimant communities and it remains possible to
apply for an export permit for Maori items (although not many are
granted).335 Nonetheless, the Act generally prevents the sale of
Maori cultural objects to parties outside of New Zealand and guards
against price inflation that will often result once cultural objects
enter the international market.336
Oliver Metzger notes that numerous jurisdictions within the
United States implicitly recognize the doctrine of res extra
commercium in relation to certain objects through choice-of-law
principles following the guidance of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws337—which, upon application of the lex situs
doctrine,338 may lead a local court to apply the law of a foreign
jurisdiction that explicitly recognizes the doctrine of res extra
331
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commercium.339 The result is that courts in the United States
ultimately apply a de facto version of res extra commercium.340
However, this notion remains virtually unrecognized and invisible
within United States law.341 Yet, as Metzger suggests, “A de jure
res extra commercium doctrine would give voice to the common
appreciation of the idea that cultures are composed, in part, of
symbolic objects and that such objects should not be subjected to the
vicissitudes of the marketplace.”342 Additionally, it “would give
expression to a common understanding that the buying and selling
of certain objects of cultural property leads to injustice.”343 Metzger
also suggests that a de jure res extra commercium would result in
clearer notice to purchasers of cultural objects as well as a greater
legal recognition of the importance of cultural objects that carry a
potent status.344
However, in arguing for a de jure res extra commercium in the
United States, Metzger reifies European legal frameworks. This is
problematic because most of the international and European legal
frameworks only go so far as to assign inalienability to potent
cultural objects rather than truly removing their potential to exist on
the marketplace. As noted in previous sections, this is through
maintenance of a market value even while the object is defined as
unmerchantable. In addition, most civil law jurisdictions—even
though they may recognize the doctrine of res extra commercium—
simultaneously place comparatively greater importance on the good
faith purchaser over the owner.345 As such, it follows that de jure res
extra commercium may logically carry less potential to protect the
transfer of a potent cultural object within a civil law jurisdiction than
it would if applied in a common law jurisdiction—even though
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common law jurisdictions generally do not recognize res extra
commercium or the notion of inalienable property.346
Metzger goes on to note that the closest mechanism for
protection of potent cultural objects that exists in the United States,
and which “reveals a consciousness at the federal level of the
significance that some items of cultural property carry,”347 is
provided by the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).348 Referring to the legislative
history of NAGPRA, Metzger suggests that NAGPRA “defers to the
tribe’s definition of a sacred object” at Section 3001(3)(C), which
defines a sacred object as “specific ceremonial objects which are
needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for the
practice of traditional Native American religions by their present
day adherents.”349 By defining the objects that fall under the
category of “cultural items” and referring to the laws of the claiming
Native American group, NAGPRA essentially renders potent
cultural objects inalienable “insofar as it returns items to a group of
people who are forbidden by their own law to alienate the items.”350
Inalienability, however, does not apply retrospectively and does not
apply to the transfer of rights in a potent cultural object after it has
been repatriated (its “subsequent alienability”).351 Additionally,
NAGPRA’s application is limited to only “Indian tribes and Native
Hawaiian organizations.”352
While NAGPRA bears no explicit mention of the
decommodification of potent cultural objects, Sarah Harding
addresses the question of whether or not NAGPRA’s definition of
cultural patrimony as “inalienable” leads to the understanding of
repatriation itself as a process of decommodification.353 While it
may be viewed in this manner by some, drawing on Appadurai and
Kopytoff;354 where the potent object diverged from the path of
commodification upon production, it has never been
346
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commodifiable. Instead, the object has suffered from invalid
commodification through the imposition of Western and
Eurocentric frameworks. In this sense, “decommodification” is
more akin to a “recognition” that these objects do not carry a
commodified value and must therefore be removed from the market
context.
D. Res Extra Commercium in Canada
Turning to the domestic context, in Canada, res extra
commercium appears most clearly in the Civil Code of Quebec
(CCQ)—reference to things that are hors du commerce.355
Federally, however, it is only loosely linked to the possibility for
some objects to be included on the Export Control List,356 which are
then subject to export control under the CPEIA.357 But in order for
an object to be included on this list, it must meet the criteria under
subsection 4(2) of the CPEIA, which reads:
Subject to subsection (3), the Governor in Council
may include in the Control List, regardless of their
places of origin, any objects or classes of objects
hereinafter described in this subsection, the export of
which the Governor in Council deems it necessary to
control in order to preserve the national heritage in
Canada:
(a) objects of any value that are of archaeological,
prehistorical, historical, artistic or scientific interest
and that have been recovered from the soil of
Canada, the territorial sea of Canada or the inland or
other internal waters of Canada;
b) objects that were made by, or objects referred to
in paragraph (d) that relate to, the aboriginal peoples
of Canada and that have a fair market value in
Canada of more than five hundred dollars;
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(c) objects of decorative art, hereinafter described in
this paragraph that were made in the territory that is
now Canada and are more than one hundred years
old:
(i) glassware, ceramics, textiles, woodenware
and works in base metals that have a fair market
value in Canada of more than five hundred dollars,
and
(ii) furniture, sculptured works in wood, works in
precious metals and other objects of decorative art
that have a fair market value in Canada of more than
two thousand dollars;
(d) books, records, documents, photographic
positives and negatives, sound recordings, and
collections of any of those objects that have a fair
market value in Canada of more than five hundred
dollars;
(e) drawings, engravings, original prints and watercolours that have a fair market value in Canada of
more than one thousand dollars; and
(f) any other objects that have a fair market value in
Canada of more than three thousand dollars.358
What is especially notable in the requirements for inclusion on
the Export Control List is the pervasive reference to “fair market
value” and the monetary quantification that is attributed to these
objects, which is contrary to the res divini juris and res extra
commercium categorization to which potent cultural objects may be
assigned. In addition, it is still possible to apply for export permit
for the objects included on the Export Control List, subject to the
examination of expert examiners. In determining whether or not to
provide the permit, pursuant to section 11(1) of the Act, the
examiners will consider:
(a) whether that object is of outstanding significance
by reason of its close association with Canadian
358
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history or national life, its aesthetic qualities, or its
value in the study of the arts or sciences; and
(b) whether the object is of such a degree of national
importance that its loss to Canada would
significantly diminish the national heritage.359
Even if the export permit is refused, the decision is still
appealable under section 29 of the CPEIA.360
E. Strict Inalienability versus the Complete Application of Res
Extra Commercium
Extending the possibilities provided by inalienability, John
Moustakas argues for the strict inalienability (versus “mere market
inalienability”) of cultural objects that qualify as “property for
grouphood.”361 For the present discussion, “property for
grouphood” would be similar to the “potent” cultural object as well
as objects falling under Articles 11 and 12 of UNDRIP.362
Moustakas is of the view that, through strict inalienability,
“protecting certain types of cultural property ought to be mandatory,
transcending the authority of national law to do otherwise.”363
While Moustakas’ strict inalienability is similar to a complete
application of res extra commercium, he rejects “market
inalienability,” or essentially, the decommodification of cultural
objects. Nonetheless, he agrees that the objects should not be
commodified: “Conceiving of personhood or grouphood in market
rhetoric by commodifying objects and attributes so essential to
personal or group being-treating them as monetizable and alienable
from the self or the group violates both our deepest understanding
of what it is to be either human or a community.”364
Yet his concern lies with the remaining ability for gratuitous
transfer: “In seeking to prevent the evil of commodification, market359
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inalienability prohibits only sales, not gifts.”365 He views strict
inalienability as a better means of protecting cultural objects from
all potential transfers.366
In this sense, strict inalienability still maintains the colonizer’s
gaze and paternalistic element, by prohibiting all transfers of
cultural objects. Regardless of the ability to block gratuitous
transfers, the ability to request the return of the object free from
barriers remains. Under a complete application of res extra
commercium that removes commodification and the transferability
of a quantifiable property right in the object, a gratuitous transfer
would speak to Noble’s description of the more fluid perception of
“ownership as belonging” versus “ownership as property.”367 This
is important since gift giving and exchange are not uncommon in the
history of potent cultural objects for the purposes of strengthening
relationships of respect and responsibility.368 Additionally, due to
res extra commercium status, the permanent transfer of property
rights in such an object would be impossible. Concern lies with the
rupture in the fluid exchange embodied by gifting and exchange
where the return of the potent cultural object in question is refused,
is conditional upon payment, or impeded by other barriers. In that
sense, strict inalienability both takes the disallowance of transfer too
far while maintaining the hegemony of Western and Eurocentric
notions of property law.
1. Determining Potency
Nonetheless, Moustakas’ model of strict inalienability is helpful
due to the flexible mechanism he suggests for identifying whether
or not a cultural object may qualify as “property for grouphood” in
order to be shielded from transfer by strict inalienability. This is very
important in addressing one of the fundamental flaws that exists in
current partial applications of res extra commercium: how to
determine what objects qualify for protection under an extra
commercium-type regime. In order to identify whether or not an
object qualifies as “property for grouphood,” Moustakas proposes a
365
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two-pronged test that is fact-sensitive and determined on a case-bycase basis: 1) the cultural object must be “bound up” with a group’s
identity;369 and 2) the retention of the object does not constitute “bad
object relations.”370 This is in contrast to the balance of international
legislation that refers to res extra commercium with the imposition
of delineated categories, as we have seen previously, where the
objects of claimants are potent if the hegemon agrees that they may
be classified as such. It is not clear, however, the precise role of legal
pluralism in Moustakas’ property for grouphood test and the weight
that would be accorded to the group’s own internal norms in
defining which objects are bound up with their identity.
In this vein, Canadian courts have been known to refer to
Aboriginal customary law and internal norms, and371 Quebec courts
have exhibited a progressive application of legal pluralism in the
identification of a potent cultural object. For the colonizer’s gaze to
be removed, the determination of what constitutes a potent object
should be determined in this manner.
IX. TOWARDS A COMPLETE APPLICATION OF RES EXTRA
COMMERCIUM
Res extra commercium provides a way of perceiving potent
cultural objects in a manner removed from the hegemony of Western
and Eurocentric frameworks.
In the international context, individual states ultimately oversee
the sale and transfer of cultural objects through their domestic laws,
369
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their application of private international law, the choice of whether
or not to ratify or implement the relevant international conventions,
and their perception of the international trade in cultural objects that
is contained within the state’s legal framework.372 This leads to
unpredictability, a lack of uniformity, and often unequitable
treatment of subaltern and non-dominant claimants when conflicts
or claims pertaining to cultural objects arise. Kurt Siehr highlights
the problems of international law in dealing with the international
commerce of cultural objects that are present due to diverging
national laws related to property and cultural heritage.373
As explored above, not only do these national legal frameworks
create barriers domestically for repatriation claims, but they are
magnified at the international level once the diverging legal
frameworks interact in claims for the return of cultural objects by
source subaltern groups and source states. All of these rules, laws,
and policies—even where the doctrine of res extra commercium is
loosely embodied in the classifications of property as inalienable—
still revolve around the market and commodified value of potent
cultural objects. Even where restrictions on the sale and transfer and
export and import of cultural objects render these transactions
illegal, they nonetheless continue to occur. This is possible since
cultural objects, regardless of legal rules, are still acceptably
assigned a market value that bears worth to the purchaser or
acquiring entity outside of the unquantifiable and unmerchantable
potent value it carries to source claimants.
International and state removal (or recognition) of the notion
that such objects may carry a monetary value will eventually lead to
a drying up of the demand for acquisition of the objects where their
potent status carries no market worth outside of the potent worth
carried by the object for source countries and source states.
A complete application of res extra commercium would make
potent cultural objects unmerchantable, remove them from the
marketplace entirely, and remove the legality of transferring
property rights held in these objects—in addition to shielding them
from acquisitive prescription, laches, and statutes of limitation.374
This complete application of res extra commercium could be used
372
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to create a unified system for dealing with potent cultural objects
that would remove many of the barriers to repatriation and return
that currently exist. This would also avoid implicating the hegemony
of the dominant Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks that
remain as colonial relics within which repatriation and return claims
must currently navigate.
Similar to Siehr’s reference to the universal recognition of
stealing as a crime where “the acquisition of title to property by theft
is forbidden,”375 the same would apply to the forbidden acquisition
of potent cultural objects classified as res extra commercium. This
approach would address the divergence that Siehr notes in relation
to the application of national rules that differ in the treatment of
acquisition of stolen property by third party purchasers, and the
application of time limitations, and so on. While theft is generally
forbidden across jurisdictional divides, the return of the removed
property is the site where divergence occurs—such as with the
greater relative importance placed on the good faith purchaser in
civil law jurisdictions, or the divergence in application of time
limitations for reclaiming a removed object, and so on. A complete
application of res extra commercium speaks to this site of
divergence where the unmerchantable status of the object does not
permit the transfer of the value of an object to a purchaser—which
renders a purchase made in good faith irrelevant as it should simply
be impossible to purchase such objects.
Time limitations for reclaiming the object would also be
irrelevant since the initial transfer of the object that prefaces reclaim
would be impossible. Where purchase does not yield acquisition of
a valid title, “then there can be no deprivation.”376
Viewing ownership as belonging instead of as property377 also
speaks to the irrelevance of the transfer of property rights that
ultimately underlies conflicts related to repatriation and return
where the object is invaluable and unmerchantable to one party (the
source) yet simultaneously carries market value for the purchaser or
possessor of the object.
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A. Res Extra Commercium in Quebec, Canada: A Complete
Application
Extending Metzger’s argument pertaining to the existence of a
de facto res extra commercium in the United States to Canada, it
could similarly be argued that the same exists in Canada where de
facto res extra commercium is applied by local courts in
adjudicating conflicts implicating private international law and the
doctrine of lex situs. Metzger instead suggests that Canada explicitly
demonstrates a version of the doctrine of res extra commercium. Yet
the example he refers to, the case of l’Ange-Gardien,378 is not
atypical of the situation in Canada. First, l’Ange-Gardien arose
within the Province of Quebec, which is a civil law jurisdiction, and
thus necessarily dealt with the claim for return through the legal
framework influenced by the civil law tradition rather than the
common law framework. Second, while the CCQ and the case of
l’Ange-Gardien may provide for the res extra commercium status of
potent cultural objects, other aspects of Quebec’s legal framework,
such as its Cultural Property Act, do not.379 Much as with Canada’s
CPEIA, sections 7.12–7.15 of Quebec’s Cultural Property Act refer
to the “fair market value of a cultural property.”380
But Metzger has revealed the tip of an iceberg with his reference
to this isolated application of res extra commercium in Canada.
Upon further examination, l’Ange-Gardien provides a potential
model for how res extra commercium could be realistically applied
across Canada in claims for repatriation and return as well as at an
international level and within international mechanisms for
repatriation and return (such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention and
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention).381 The importance of l’AngeGardien is also elevated through its application of legal pluralism in
determining whether or not an object is potent in order to benefit
from res extra commercium (or hors de commerce status in this
case). This case demonstrates that Quebec law is able to easily apply
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res extra commercium by reference to the law of the group in
question in order to determine potency.
It is also important to note that in this case the res extra
commercium status of the potent cultural objects trumped the typical
importance accorded to the third party good faith purchaser and
good faith possessor.
1. l’Ange-Gardien and Quebec Law
The current CCQ came into effect on January 1, 1994 and
replaced the Civil Code of Lower Canada (CCLC), which had been
in effect since July 1, 1866. The CCLC was still in force at the time
l’Ange-Gardien was heard by the Superior Court of Quebec and the
Quebec Court of Appeal. The CCLC implicitly referred to canon
law in provisions such as Article 2217, which dealt explicitly with
things deemed sacred.382 While today the CCQ does not have an
exact equivalent to Article 2217 CCLC and does not refer explicitly
to sacred objects in the same manner, it maintains the notion by
reference to the concept of things that are hors de commerce—
essentially a permutation of res extra commercium—in Article 2876
as well as through the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure Article 553,
which deems certain things as exempt from seizure.
As explained above, objects that fall under this category cannot
be sold, and thus they are exempt from seizure and prescription such
that property and ownership rights cannot be acquired simply due to
the passage of time. According to Article 2217, while there are
certain things that are hors de commerce due to their very nature
(such as human corpses), other things are deemed hors de commerce
due to their “destination” (or “purpose,” such as worship).383 But
382

Civil Code of Lower Canada, 29 Vict. ch. 41, art. 2217 (Can.):
Les choses sacrées, tant que la destination n'en a pas été changée
autrement par l'empiétement souffert, ne peuvent s'acquérir par
prescription.

Les cimetières, considérés comme chose sacrée, ne peuvent être
changés de destination de manière à donner lieu à la prescription,
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See also id. art. 2218.
383
See also Benoit Pelletier, The Case of the Treasures of L'Ange Gardien: An
Overview, 2 INT'L. J. CULTURAL PROP. 371, 372 (1993).

380

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 4:297

aside from legislation that provides for potent items as well as
reference to canon law, Quebec courts have also demonstrated how
the notion of hors de commerce—or res extra commercium—may
be interpreted and realistically applied through legal pluralistic
methodology in addressing civil legal matters.
As far as the internal legal framework of the Roman Catholic
Church functions, canon law takes precedence followed by State
law,384 and State law regulates the Church’s system of ownership by
providing a juridical structure.385 Since 1791, Quebec has integrated
relevant canon law through legislation such as the current Act
Respecting Fabriques.386
The most important points to take away from the case of l’AngeGardien for the present purposes are:
(1) the court’s deference to the internal norms and rules of
the claimant group in determining the objects claimed were
sacred (or “potent”);
(2) the resulting application of hors de commerce status (or
res extra commercium) through a legal pluralistic
methodology;
(3) the nullification of the transfer of property due to its
sacred, invaluable, and hors de commerce status, and
unsanctioned sale pursuant to the internal process, norms,
and rules of the claimant group; and
(4) that the objects were returned to the claimant without
indemnity to the possessors in spite of the bona fide nature
of the sale, the seller, and third party good faith
purchasers.387
384

Ernest Caparros, La Propriété des Églises Catholiques au Québec, in QUEL
AVENIR POUR QUELLES ÉGLISES? WHAT FUTURE FOR WHICH CHURCHES 91, 91
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Founded in 1664, the parish of l’Ange Gardien in Quebec is one
of Canada’s oldest.388 The facts of the case begin around 1962 with
the Roman Catholic Church in the midst of an overhaul of its liturgy
that sought to move towards greater simplicity.389 This required
many parish priests, such as the former parish priest of l’AngeGardien, Joseph-Henri Gariépy, to reorganize and downsize the
Church environment.390 This effort often involved the hasty sale of
cultural objects at bargain prices—much to the delight of museums
and collectors—since most parish priests were not aware of the
artistic, cultural, and patrimonial value embodied by these
objects.391
Gariépy sold Roger Prévost, a sculptor-guilder, a series of
objects that Gariépy believed to be of little value. Evidence
produced during the superior court hearings showed the purchase
price to have been 800 Canadian dollars.392 Yet, the market value of
these objects was far higher than the price for which they were
sold.393 And in selling these objects, Gariépy never asked for
permission through the proper channels within the Catholic Church,
although the checks for the purchase of the objects were made
treated the bona fide sale of cultural objects to “innocent” third parties. See, e.g.,
FORREST, supra note 1, at 302; STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at ch. 2 n.134.
Even though l’Ange-Gardien was decided in accordance with the provisions of
the CCLC, both the case and Article 2217 of the CCLC remain relevant. l’AngeGardien has been referred to after the coming into force of the CCQ in order to
assert that the sacred nature of a thing places it under hors de commerce status,
thus making it inalienable: Camies-Lefebvre c. Lefebvre [2006], R.D.I. 31, para.
12 (Can. Qc.). The Quebec Superior Court has also referred to l’Ange-Gardien
since the coming into force of the CCQ in order to state that the internal rules of
a religion should be used determine the sacred status of a thing. Jetté-Corbeil c.
Oratoire Église Baptiste Française, J.E. 2000-1534 (Can. Qc.). In this same vein,
Maurice Tancelin explains that where some important provisions from the
CCLC are not expressly included in the CCQ, their absence does not connote
repeal since only formal repeal could accomplish this. Article 2217 CCLC has
never been formally repealed. Les Dilences du Code Civil du Quebec, 39 MLJ
747 (1994).
388
L'Ange-Gardien (Paroisse) c. Québec (Procureur Général) (1987), 8 Q.A.C.
1, 13 (Can.). See also O’Keefe, Repatriation, supra note 77, at 231.
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payable to the parish’s Church Council and were deposited in the
Church Council’s bank account.394
Through a series of subsequent sales, the objects eventually
came to be housed in the National Gallery of Canada and the Musée
du Quebec, as well as with private collectors. Gariépy left the parish
in 1973 and his successor, Marc Leclerc, began to question the sale
of the objects until he was finally able to trace them to their current
possessors.395 Upon locating them, he referred to the CCLC’s
treatment of sacred objects as imprescriptible and hors de commerce
in order to argue that the objects remained protected under this
category of things since their sacred “destination” remained. He
argued that their destination remained the same because they had not
been desacralized according to canon law. Additionally, Leclerc
noted that the objects had been alienated without the written
authorization that must be obtained from the archbishop of the
diocese and that the sale of these objects was thus illegal pursuant
to Quebec civil law.396
Following this line of argumentation, in 1976 the Church
Council of the parish filed a lawsuit against Prévost and the other
parties in possession of the objects. The lawsuit sought the return of
the objects and the nullification of the original transaction.397 The
defendants, however, argued that the provisions of the CCLC could
not be relied on in asserting canon law since the CCLC did not
expressly refer to it. According to the defendants, this meant that
transaction remained valid because, without reference to canon law,
it was irrelevant that Gariépy had not received written permission to
sell the objects and that he had both the right to transfer the objects
as well as the power to change the destination of the objects, which
they argued were thus desacralized upon sale.398
In a 136-page judgment, Justice Bernier of the Quebec Superior
Court agreed with the arguments of the claimant and recognized the
application of canon law in relation to the identification of a sacred
object as well as the process to be followed in order to desacralize
394

L’Ange-Gardien, 8 Q.A.C. at 25, 28. See also Pelletier, supra note 383, at
373.
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L’Ange-Gardien, 8 Q.A.C. at 38. See also Pelletier, supra note 383, at 373.
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and validly alienate the objects in question.399 Following this
analysis, Justice Bernier ultimately found the objects in question to
be hors de commerce according to canon law and thus, also
according to Quebec law. He also found that the defendants had not
met their burden of demonstrating that the objects had been
desacralized.400 This resulted in the nullification of the initial
contract of sale without indemnification to the defendants.401
Interestingly, Justice Bernier asserted that the defendants should
have known that the purchased objects came from a parish or a
religious community, that the objects were sacred pursuant to
Article 2217 CCLC, and that they did not discharge their burden of
insuring that the objects had been appropriately desacralized.402 He
went on to suggest that the defendants should have done this if they
wished to avoid the enforcement of “public order” mandating the
unindemnified return of the objects to the claimant.403
The decision of the superior court was upheld in the Quebec
Court of Appeal.404 Agreeing with Justice Maloof’s opinion in
support of the first instance judge’s ruling, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
wrote that the relevant portions of the CCLC should be construed in
accordance with the internal rules, norms, and codes of the particular
group in question. She specifically referred to sectarian groups and
their codes, such as Catholic canon law, the Torah for Judaism, and
the Koran for those of Muslim faith.405 But Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
also noted that these codes were not explicitly incorporated into
Quebec law and that it instead referred to the authority and
sovereignty of the group in question to determine their beliefs.406
Some of the defendants, notably the National Museums of
Canada and Prévost (the original purchaser), appealed the decision
to the Supreme Court of Canada, but leave to appeal was denied on
17 December 1987.407 With this definitive confirmation of the
399
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decisions of the Quebec Superior Court and the Quebec Court of
Appeal, the potent cultural objects of l’Ange-Gardien were finally
returned home to the parish’s Church Council.
X. WHO DECIDES WHAT IS POTENT: LEGAL PLURALISM AS
METHODOLOGY
l’Ange-Gardien demonstrates an important element in applying
res extra commercium: how the potency of an object may be
determined. Even if Moustakas’ two-pronged test is applied,
whether or not the object is “bound up” with a group’s identity
would require a subjective case-by-case assessment determined
through reference to a group’s internal cultural and customary
rules.408 As a result, legal pluralism is needed in order to fully apply
res extra commercium in a manner appropriate to dealing with the
claimant group in question.
While legal pluralism bears the brunt of numerous critiques that
warn against viewing its use as a panacea,409 the particular
application of legal pluralism used in l'Ange-Gardien is important
because it defers to the claimant group's cultural or customary
internal rules of what constitutes a potent object in determining an
object's res sacrae status. Legal pluralism, used in this context,
would create international consistency towards deference to the
claimant group’s notions of the potent object in their claims for the
return of such objects. Applying legal pluralism in this manner thus
leads to the ability for greater incorporation of res extra
commercium, which would effectively enforce the invaluable nature
of potent cultural objects, remove them from the market, and
eliminate the colonizer’s gaze that remains embodied by the current
hegemony of legal frameworks available for repatriation and return.
In order to recreate this outcome, international courts and other
states need to incorporate this level of deference.
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A. Acceptable Evidence and Legal Pluralism
R v. Heller—the case involving the attempt by the government
of Nigeria to recover a Nok artifact that had been illegally exported
from Nigeria and imported into Canada410—exhibits the reality of
having international mechanisms that address claims for return.
Local courts are often hindered by domestic law in applying
international conventions as these may only have come into effect
on the date upon which they were incorporated into the domestic
legal framework. R v. Heller also demonstrates the role played by
the acceptability of various forms of evidence in domestic courts.
Difficulties with acceptable evidence exist on a number of fronts,
including the need to prove the provenance of the object, the potency
of the object, and the object’s potency to the claimant group.
Even when an equitable resolution should clearly result in the
return of potent cultural objects, rigid domestic and international
legal frameworks insist on evidence that meets the standards of the
forum within which claims are heard. And most of the time these
standards are based on conventional Western and Eurocentric
conceptions of ownership, title, property, time, purchase, market
value, and commodification. As demonstrated in l’Ange-Gardien,
the application of legal pluralism and reference to the evidence that
would be required according to the claimant group’s own internal
rules would provide the opportunity for a more equitable resolution
that begins to step away from the hegemony of Western and
Eurocentric legal frameworks.411
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CONCLUSION
A. The Realities of Implementation and Enforcement
While enforcing the cooperation of destination, or “market,”
states would likely pose a challenge,412 the model outlined by this
Article challenges the ever-present colonizer’s mentality that exists
within destination states. The goal is removing the colonial gaze and
it takes time to alter pervasive worldviews. But where an object no
longer has value and purchasers are expected to know that certain
objects are susceptible to res extra commercium status—as was
stated of the third-party purchasers in l’Ange-Gardien—this
knowledge and responsibility will ideally become part of the
cultural fabric of destination states.
A brief analogy to the trafficking of illegal substances can be
drawn. When they are bought and traded, the parties to the
transaction are aware that the product could be stripped from them
without compensation because it is not a legally merchantable
product. It is not possible to purchase an illegal substance in good
faith or by accident. In the vein of Justice Bernier’s decision in
l’Ange-Gardien, the excuse of the innocent third party purchaser
would no longer be a shield as it would become accepted that the
purchaser “really should have known better” and should have done
their due diligence in researching the provenance and potency of the
object in question in order to meet their onus.
Justice Bernier’s discussion of this matter is in direct contrast to
Judge Gray’s uncomfortable decision in Peru v. Johnson regarding
the return of Pre-Columbian cultural objects to Peru.413 Judge Gray
referenced the uncomfortable reality of the legal framework
blocking Peru from its claims for the return of the objects. The
difficulties encountered notably intersect with the market value that
these objects have been attributed—their sale and the value behind
ownership—and the notion of a purchase made in good faith. Even
though Judge Gray noted the priceless nature of the objects in
question and that the courts of the United States should have been
supportive of Peru in its endeavours to remedy and end the
412
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destruction of its cultural heritage, the good faith element of the
purchase trumps the priceless importance of these objects to their
source.
Irrespective of the decision in this matter, the court
has considerable sympathy for Peru with respect to
the problems that it confronts as manifested by this
litigation. It is evident that many priceless and
beautiful Pre-Columbian artifacts excavated from
historical monuments in that country have been and
are being smuggled abroad and sold to museums and
other collectors of art. Such conduct is destructive of
a major segment of the cultural heritage of Peru, and
the plaintiff is entitled to the support of the courts of
the United States in its determination to prevent
further looting of its patrimony.
However, there is substantial evidence that Mr.
Johnson purchased the subject items in good faith
over the years, and the plaintiff must overcome legal
and factual burdens that are heavy indeed before the
court can justly order the subject items to be removed
from the defendant's possession and turned over to
the plaintiff.414
In Canada, if the res extra commercium status of an object were
to trump a bona fide purchase and lead to its removal from the hands
of the purchaser, this might be reminiscent of forfeiture cases
dealing with foreign cultural objects smuggled into Canada. At the
border, the smuggler often misidentifies the value and place of
origin of the smuggled cultural objects, which leads to forfeiture
under Section 122 of Canada’s Customs Act.415 The forfeited
objects then become property of the Crown and are usually sent back
to the object’s country of origination.416
Economically, the potential res extra commercium status of
cultural objects creates a risk that motivates potential buyers to meet
a self-imposed higher onus in acquiring cultural objects. Cultural
objects would become risky investments without thorough research
414
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and the barriers in acquiring the objects (rather than in the return of
the objects) may lessen demand.
Certainly the argument exists that disallowing the sale of potent
cultural objects would create a black market for their sale and even
inflate their value417—but this is largely a red herring. Removing the
commodification of these objects and the ability for them to be
assigned a market value would work to remove the colonial Western
and Eurocentric barriers that currently exist in frameworks for
repatriation and return. Once objects were located, the process to
have them returned—skewed towards Western and Eurocentric
notions—would at least remove the necessity of purchasing an
object that is not commodifiable. The intent would be to create a
long-term change in the mentality of those interested in cultural
artifacts: that potent cultural objects cannot be bought and sold as
they do not travel within Western and Eurocentric notions of
commodification.
B. Remaining Work to be Done
Of course it bears noting that removing the commodification of
cultural objects is no panacea in dealing with the exact group,
location, state, and so on, that an object should be returned to.
Internationally, even when cultural objects are returned to a source
country, this does not necessarily address the concerns of subaltern
groups within the borders of the states or groups that span the
borders of neighbouring states.418 Domestically, the return of objects
to particular indigenous groups within a state will again not
necessarily account for subaltern groups that may be marginalized
within the indigenous group in question—whether due to gender
identity, social hierarchies, or economic prowess. However, the
focus of applying res extra commercium through legal pluralistic
methodology is to identify and deconstruct the overarching barriers
that are faced in claims for repatriation and return and the colonial
gaze that is maintained by viewing and dealing with potent cultural
417
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objects through Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks and
notions of commodification.
Whenever a new system is instituted, manners of treating the
retrospective application must be addressed and those who may find
themselves suddenly dispossessed of the market value of an object
purchased would not be entirely pleased with the situation. These
challenges, while they are beyond the scope of the Article,
demonstrate that much work will need to be done to truly and
completely remove the colonizer’s gaze. The intent here stems from
a critical analysis to suggest a mechanism that might change
perceptions. An analysis that might raise awareness as to the deeply
problematic legal and extralegal frameworks that characterize the
current options available for claims of repatriation and return by
subaltern groups and countries as the scourges of colonialism are
gradually removed. This Article’s intention has been to explore what
a departure from the status quo might look like if the attempt were
made to remove all relics of colonialism exemplified by the
hegemony of Western and Eurocentric values, frameworks, and
commodification.

